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The rise in prominence of public apologies since the mid 1990s and increased awareness of the 
frequency and severity of medical errors in the United States has led to scholarly and 
professional interest in doctors’ apologies in response to medical error. Literature targeting 
health care professionals indicates a growing consensus about the ethical and professional 
imperatives for apology. However, it also exposes the authors’ difficulty in achieving conceptual 
clarity about apology and its application to modern clinical practice carried out by multiple 
providers within complex medical, legal, and insurance systems. 
This project articulates the ethical underpinnings of apology and establishes ethically and 
professionally appropriate responses—both by clinicians and administrators of health care 
institutions—to medical error. Foundationally, this argument includes clarifying salient 
distinctions related to medical error and adverse events and conceptualizing apology as it is 
applicable to health care contexts. In sum, a policy or culture of responsibility—to which 
apology may instrumentally contribute—is ethically valuable and contributes to overall quality 
of care in contemporary health care institutions. The roles and responsibilities of clinicians and 
administrators within a culture of responsibility are discussed, in addition to the structure, 
applications, limitations, and ethical considerations of policies regarding apology. 
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1.0  ERRORS, WRONGS, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
It seems that every week another public figure, ranging from professional athletes to heads of 
state, offers a widely publicized apology. Psychiatrist and former medical school chancellor 
Aaron Lazare notes that, since the mid 1990s, the public prominence of apologies has been 
noticeably higher than in past generations.1 This “apology phenomenon” has been of interest in 
lay and scholarly circles alike.2 One realm where apologies have been widely discussed and 
remain controversial, despite the proliferation of political and public apologies in other realms, is 
in health care. The current discussions of apologies in medical literature, however, do not mean 
that doctors have not always had personal and professional concerns about the ethically and 
professionally appropriate way to respond to the realization that they have made a mistake. 
Adding fuel to the proverbial fire of the apology question, the Institute of Medicine’s 1999 
report, To Err is Human, shocked the nation with its figures about the frequency and severity of 
medical errors occurring in the United States each year.3  
While access to and quality of health care have been perennial issues in public, 
professional, and academic spheres, the specific focus on the role of apology in health care 
contexts has sharpened only in the early years of this millennium. There are likely multiple 
                                                 
1 Aaron Lazare, On Apology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 6-7. 
2 Lazare, On Apology, 7. 
3 Nancy Berlinger, After Harm: Medical Error and the Ethics of Forgiveness (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 11. 
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reasons for increased concern about professional responses to medical error. First, as Lazare 
indicates, Americans have become increasingly interested in and attentive to public apologies 
offered for a wide range of offenses. Second, Americans’ attitudes about the relationship 
between patients and care providers has shifted away from a predominantly paternalistic “doctor 
knows best” mentality to a more cooperative care team approach in which the patient has the 
right to (and, prescriptively, should) participate in decisions about her health care. Attention to 
such rights is incompatible with the traditional “deny and defend” stance of hospitals and doctors 
toward adverse events, a stance that is falling out of favor with the increased advocacy of an 
acknowledge and apologize approach. Whereas it was once commonly accepted that disclosing a 
medical error and apologizing to the patient (or the patient’s family) would render well-meaning 
doctors vulnerable to career-ending malpractice suits, today nearly 30 states have laws protecting 
physicians’ empathic and apologetic expressions to patients, and a handful have passed 
legislation mandating disclosure of adverse events.4 Today, newspaper articles with titles such as 
“Hospitals Learn to Say Sorry”5 or “Doctors Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Before ‘See You in Court,’”6 
pieces in medical journals that advise physicians how to “Apologize Like a Pro,”7 and even a 
book about “the power of apology in medicine”8 are not rarities. While these publications 
indicate a growing consensus about the ethical and professional imperatives for apology, they 
also expose the difficulty in the field to achieve and maintain conceptual clarity about apology. 
Some apology advocates are unclear about how—or if—apology is distinguished from mere 
                                                 
4 Stacey Butterfield, “Apologize Like a Pro,” ACPHospitalist (January 2008): 14. 
5 Maura Lerner, “Hospitals Learn to Say Sorry,” Star Tribune [Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN], March 29, 
2008. 
6 Kevin Sack, “Doctors Say ‘I’m Sorry’ Before ‘See You in Court,’” New York Times, May 18, 2008. 
7 Butterfield, “Apologize Like a Pro,” 14. 
8 Michael S. Woods, Healing Words: The Power of Apology in Medicine (Oak Park, IL: Doctors in Touch, 
2004). 
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disclosure of errors and the expression of empathy; more ambiguity surrounds the types of 
circumstances that, according to the medical apology literature, warrant apology. 
This thesis contributes to an examination of the apology proliferation in healthcare with 
the specific goals of articulating the ethical underpinnings of apology and conceptualizing 
ethically and professionally appropriate responses to instances of error, both by clinicians and 
administrators of health care institutions. This focus on not only clinicians but also 
administrators recognizes that modern medical practice does not take place in an isolated bubble 
inhabited by a lone doctor and her patient. Rather, a nexus of care providers, other professionals, 
and diverse employees contribute to patient care within complex medical, legal, and insurance 
systems. If we include apology as a possible ethical response under consideration (or, even, a 
response that is preferable to denial), we may also need to ask the same questions posed by 
sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis about apologies offered by collectives: “[H]ow is an apology 
formulated in this context and what does it signify? What does it, or can it, render when 
essentially inanimate, and therefore mute, social entities require human agents to speak on their 
behalf? Finally, can we speak of collective sorrow and regret in any sense other than 
metaphorically?”9 Armed with these concerns, I analyze the ethics of institutional apologies 
offered in response to instances of medical error. 
The thesis is organized into four chapters. The first chapter addresses the topic of medical 
errors and differentiates among bad outcomes, adverse events, iatrogenic illness, mistakes, 
negligence, and breaches of standard of care. Additionally, this chapter discusses the practical 
and ethical distinctions between being wronged and being harmed, specifically with regard to 
health care contexts. The second chapter turns to the topic of apology, conceptualizing it along 
                                                 
9 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991), 96. 
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the lines of its core definition, its appropriate contexts and goals, its requisite components, key 
participants in the social practice of apology, and the differences between apologies offered by 
individuals and those offered by institutions through a spokesperson. The third chapter lays out 
the reasons why a policy or culture of responsibility-taking is ethically valuable in contemporary 
health care institutions. I discuss the roles and responsibilities appropriately assigned to 
clinicians and administrators within a culture of responsibility and address the structure, 
applications, limitations, and ethical considerations of policies regarding apology. The 
concluding chapter addresses additional ethical rationales and considerations for apology within 
a culture of responsibility. Throughout the thesis, I use the case of the transplantation error at 
Duke University Medical Center that resulted in the death of Jesica Santillan and the subsequent 
responses by Duke and its physicians to illustrate and test the proposed theory of apology for 
medical error. 
1.1 UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL ERROR 
As a prerequisite to understanding ethical responses to medical error, we must be clear about 
what constitutes medical error and how to differentiate between such errors and other adverse 
events and bad outcomes in health care. Key terms defined and discussed in this chapter include 
the standard of care, bad outcomes, adverse events and adverse drug reactions, iatrogenic illness, 
medical error, sentinel events, and negligence. These concepts hold ethical as well as legal 
significance, so we must be clear about what types of events warrant the offering of apology. 
In order to have any discussion about error, we must presuppose that a standard exists 
from which an error is some sort of deviation. The standard of care in medicine refers to 
  4
“performance expectations, structures, or processes that must be in place for an organization to 
provide safe and high quality care, treatment, and service.”10 This standard shifts as the best 
practices in medicine are continually tested and refined, and it is the physician’s responsibility to 
keep up with research developments in her field in order to assure that she is meeting the ever 
evolving standard of care. Care providers are professionally and morally obligated to provide 
services that meet or exceed the standard of care, which serves as a quality benchmark. However, 
the therapeutic obligation demands that clinicians adapt standards and guidelines to meet the 
particular needs of specific patients. With increased latitude for individual judgment comes 
increased moral and legal responsibility for avoiding errors and harms.11 Additionally, a scarcity 
of resources—including technology—may confound clinicians’ efforts to perform according to 
best practices. Diagnostic and therapeutic technologies available in an urban, academic medical 
center may not be available in more rural or less affluent areas of the country. The abstract ideal 
of the standard of care must be understood within the context of care to which it is applied; the 
standard of care reflects the “performance expectations, structures, or processes” to which one 
has access. 
An adverse event in medical care can occur whether or not an error has taken place. For 
example, a medication or treatment may cause an uncomfortable or harmful effect, even when 
applied correctly. The Institute of Medicine defines an adverse event, in part, as “an injury 
caused by medical management rather than the underlying condition of the patient.”12 Adverse 
events may either be unexpected or may be consistent with known possible side effects or 
                                                 
10 Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual 
For Hospitals: The Official Handbook (Oakbrook Terrace, IL: Joint Commission, 2008), GL-22. 
11 Virginia A. Sharpe and Alan I. Faden, Medical Harm: Historical, Conceptual, and Ethical Dimensions of 
Iatrogenic Illness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 106-7. 
12 Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System (Washington, D.C.: National 
Academy Press, 2000), 28. 
  5
reactions. Co-morbidity—known or unknown—may confound or complicate a course of 
treatment and result in adverse events. An allergic reaction to an unknown trigger, such as 
medication or latex, is an adverse event, as might be a hospital-acquired infection.  
A subset of adverse events is the adverse drug reaction (ADR), defined as the 
“unintended, undesirable, or unexpected effects of prescribed medications or of medication 
errors” that result in any of the following consequences: the need to discontinue or modify the 
dose of a medication, the need to treat the patient with additional prescription medication, 
required hospitalization (or prolonged hospitalization), disability, cognitive deterioration or 
impairment, congenital anomalies, life-threatening illness, or death.13 Like the broader class of 
adverse events, ADRs are not necessarily the result of an error, though they may occur when 
insufficient attention is given to a patient’s documented allergies or the interaction of multiple 
drugs that the patient has been prescribed. 
Obviously, adverse events result from less ethically benign incidents, as well. The 
Institute of Medicine defines “preventable adverse events” as those attributable to error.14 
Bedsores, for example, result from inadequate implementation of known prevention methods like 
specialized bedding and routine physical movement and adjustment of a sedentary patient. 
Medical errors—discussed in more detail below—may result in an adverse event such as 
infection, impaired cognition, or other morbidity, although error may occur without an adverse 
event resulting.  
A key feature of medical error, “the failure of a planned action to be completed as 
intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim,”15 is that it is a deviation from the 
                                                 
13 Joint Commission, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual, GL-2. 
14 Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human, 28. 
15 Institute of Medicine, To Err is Human, 4. 
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standard of care and is, therefore, preventable. The definition given here from the Institute of 
Medicine accommodates both errors of execution and errors of planning, respectively. Virginia 
A. Sharpe and Alan I. Faden define a mistake as “an error in action, opinion, or judgment caused 
by poor reasoning, carelessness, or insufficient knowledge.”16 To call an action or inaction an 
“error” or a “mistake” is to maintain that a correct plan would be chosen by almost all others in 
the same situation (a statistically normal plan, not an idealized or possible plan) or that the 
proper skills and reasoning of execution would have been displayed by almost all others in that 
situation.17 Using these norms and standards of professional practice are helpful in thinking 
through error. In sum, error is a deviation from the processes and practices that constitute the 
standard of care.  
However, the conceptualization of medical error includes several subcategories and 
definitional refinements. Sociologist Charles L. Bosk describes four categories of preventable 
individual errors: technical errors, judgmental errors, normative errors, and quasi-normative 
errors.18 Technical errors are those that arise from inadequate skill applied to the task at hand and 
are committed more commonly by inexperienced physicians than by those with more familiarity 
and practice with particular procedures; increased training and experience lead to a decrease in 
frequency of the commission of technical errors.19 Examples of technical errors may include 
injury caused by a wayward scope, repeated attempts to place an intravenous line, or an 
inadvertent slip of the scalpel during surgery. Judgmental errors are the incorrect choice of a 
treatment strategy and are made more often by those with discretionary power over patients’ 
                                                 
16 Sharpe and Faden, Medical Harm, 137. 
17 Edmund G. Howe, “How Should Ethics Consultants Respond When Careproviders Have Made or May 
Have Made a Mistake? Beware of Ethical Flypaper!” in Margin of Error: The Ethics of Mistakes in the Practice of 
Medicine, ed. Susan B. Rubin and Laurie Zoloth (Hagerstown, MD: University Publishing Group, 2000), 165-81. 
18 Charles L. Bosk, Forgive and Remember: Managing Medical Failure (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1979), 37. 
19 Bosk, Forgive and Remember, 37, 45. 
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care.20 That a judgmental error has occurred tends to be determined in hindsight on the basis of 
the consequences: “Clinical results, not scientific reasoning, determine how correct judgment 
is.”21 Examples of judgmental error include failing to perform surgery when it is needed and 
prescribing the wrong medication to treat a specific disease. Like technical errors, judgmental 
errors can be decreased with additional training and experience and are not necessarily a sign 
that a physician is irredeemably incompetent. Normative errors and quasi-normative errors are 
breaches in role responsibilities within the hierarchy of institutionalized medicine and “signal 
error in assuming a role.”22 Normative errors include a subordinate’s failure to disclose a 
patient’s condition change to her attending physician or the hospital’s house staff quarreling with 
nurses and support staff. They are treated as moral and personal shortcomings rather than the 
inevitable errors of a conscientious physician.23 Whereas normative errors are breaches in the 
role expectations that are generally held by attending physicians, quasi-normative errors are 
breaches in the expectations of a particular physician for her particular subordinates. Norms 
discussed in the language of “what is done on my service” or “the way I do things” indicate that 
the supervising physician expects the subordinate to follow specific instructions rather than 
exercise individual discretion or judgment about the “right” way to treat patients; a failure to 
abide by these individualized norms constitutes a quasi-normative error. Normative and quasi-
normative errors do not necessarily risk harm to patients, but the commission of these errors 
undermines the reputation of the offender and diminishes the trust afforded to the offender by her 
superiors.24 They result when clinicians fail to understand their limitations and fail to seek help 
                                                 
20 Bosk, Forgive and Remember, 45. 
21 Bosk, Forgive and Remember, 45. 
22 Bosk, Forgive and Remember, 51, 55. 
23 Bosk, Forgive and Remember, 60. 
24 Bosk, Forgive and Remember, 61. 
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from others when needed—instead asserting self-sufficiency—at the possible expense of patient 
safety.25  
Physician Lucian L. Leape’s definitions of slips and mistakes map onto the categories of 
technical and judgmental errors described by Bosk, although the fit between the two sets of 
distinctions is not tight. “Slips” according to Leape, are skill-based, action errors when one 
commits a glitch in one’s automatic activity, usually because of distraction, fatigue, or 
interruption.26 Examples of slips include charting patient notes in the wrong chart (perhaps after 
being distracted by a conversation about that patient) and ordering a typical or standard dosage 
of a medication that is an inappropriate dose for this particular patient (following an automatic 
behavior pattern). While, in effect, these slips share similarities with Bosk’s technical errors, 
Leape attributes slips to diminished attentiveness to familiar and routine tasks at hand rather than 
on an actor’s unfamiliarity or lack of experience with those tasks. By contrast, a “mistake” is a 
rule-based, knowledge error arising from faulty reasoning.27 According to this definition, a 
mistake is the same as a judgmental error in Bosk’s schema. Mistakes include misinterpreting 
diagnostic information and misapplying a treatment “rule” to an inappropriate context. To 
contrast with the dosage slip above, a dosage mistake may be the result of conscious, but 
incorrect reasoning that the standard dose is the correct dose, as opposed to omitting the 
reasoning stage entirely.  
Medical errors may or may or may not result in harm to the patient but typically have the 
potential for such harm. A medication dosing error may be caught before delivery to the patient, 
or the dosing error may not have an appreciable effect on the patient. Patient misidentification, 
                                                 
25 Joel E. Frader, “Mistakes in Medicine: Personal and Moral Responses,” in Rubin and Zoloth, Margin of 
Error, 121. 
26 Lucian L. Leape, “Error in Medicine,” in Rubin and Zoloth, Margin of Error, 100. 
27 Leape, “Error in Medicine,” 100. 
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wrong site surgery, misdiagnosis (in some cases, according to the diagnostic standard of care and 
professional practice standards), and administering a documented allergen to a patient are all 
instances of medical error, even if the error is detected and corrected before harm occurs.  
When an adverse event or error is serious enough, it may warrant designation as a 
sentinel event, as defined by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO):  a sentinel event is “an unexpected occurrence involving death or serious physical or 
psychological injury, or the risk thereof. Serious injury specifically includes loss of limb or 
function. The phrase ‘or the risk thereof’ includes any process variation for which a recurrence 
would carry a significant chance of a serious adverse outcome.”28 Sentinel events are not 
necessarily the result of a medical error, and not all medical errors lead to a sentinel event; still, 
the term “sentinel” indicates that these types of events are deemed to require immediate attention 
and response.29 JCAHO asks accredited healthcare organizations to voluntarily report sentinel 
events so that JCAHO may review them. JCAHO also recommends that the institutional 
response to sentinel events should include “conducting a timely, thorough, and credible root 
cause analysis [focusing on systems and processes rather than individuals30]; developing an 
action plan designed to implement improvements to reduce risk; implementing the 
improvements; and monitoring the effectiveness of those improvements.”31  
Adverse events, adverse drug reactions, and medical errors may also be categorized as 
iatrogenic illness—illness that finds its source in any or “all health care providers who are 
directly or indirectly responsible for the care of the patient.”32 Iatrogenic illness also includes 
                                                 
28 Joint Commission, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual, SE-1, GL-22. 
29 Joint Commission, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual, SE-1. 
30 Joint Commission, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual, SE-2. 
31 Joint Commission, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual, SE-1. 
32 Sharpe and Faden, Medical Harm, 117. 
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nosocomial infection, which is “one that develops in a patient after admission to a hospital; the 
infection was neither present nor in the incubation stage at the time of the patient’s admission 
unless related to a previous hospitalization.”33 Additionally, some iatrogenic illnesses, including 
nosocomial infections, may qualify as sentinel events according to the JCAHO standards. 
 Many adverse events may occur even when health care providers are following the 
standard of care: hospital-related infections occur even when hygiene and sanitation standards 
are met, adverse drug reactions sometimes occur because of a previously unknown intolerance 
for a particular medication, and some surgical interventions will result in heart failure and death. 
But some result from unintended errors and even from intentional or negligent action. In the 
medical context, negligence is a frequently discussed type of error, one that overlaps with some 
of the types of error identified by Leape and Bosk. Medical neglect is “the absence of minimal 
services or resources to meet basic needs” and includes the failure to provide a safe environment, 
adequate nutrition and hydration or appropriate medical care (except in instances where such 
interventions are refused), hygiene, or clothing. 34 Medical negligence may occur when the 
physician undertakes an inappropriate procedure, based on the physician’s or team’s skill (a 
normative error, according to Bosk) and other factors. Sharpe and Faden discuss four criteria that 
must be met in order for a care team to recommend appropriately a procedure. A failure to meet 
these criteria indicates the inappropriateness of an intervention: “If an intervention is inconsistent 
with the patient’s clinical presentation or if the physician or team is insufficiently skilled to carry 
out the intervention (e.g., has a high complication rate), then the intervention is de facto 
inappropriate and should not be recommended,” regardless of the procedure’s normal 
                                                 
33 Proceedings of the International Conference on Nosocomial Infections, August 3-6, 1970 (Atlanta: 
Center for Disease Control, 1971), 42. Qtd in Sharpe and Faden, Medical Harm, 158. 
34 Joint Commission, Comprehensive Accreditation Manual, GL-14. 
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benefit/harm ratio or the quality of evidence about the efficacy of the procedure.35 In a case 
where the patient’s condition does not indicate a particular treatment or where the physician is 
unqualified to perform the intervention and does so anyway, there is a clear breach of the 
standard to provide safe, high quality care to the patient. 
Since the standard of care is not met in cases of negligence, health care providers in these 
cases may be guilty of malpractice and face legal sanctions. Malpractice—legal liability for the 
harms caused by alleged negligence—can be determined if all of the following criteria are met: 
(1) the provider has a duty (standard of care) in this particular situation; (2) the provider breaches 
that duty; (3) the affected party suffers harm (physical and/or “pain and suffering”); and (4) the 
harm was caused by the breach of standard of care.36 The process of legally finding malpractice 
and awarding compensation “depends upon the identification of an individual agent who, in 
failing to abide by established standards, caused harm to a patient.”37 Without the identification 
of this individual, malpractice cannot be determined. 
 Commentators have identified several reasons why the medical malpractice system is by 
itself ineffective for reducing instances of medical error.38 First, medical malpractice is only 
concerned with instances of demonstrable harm to a patient in which the patient or her surrogates 
respond with legal action; it does nothing to assess or prevent medical errors that do not directly 
harm patients. Yet, many scholars claim that most errors do not result in harm to patients, and 
thus the malpractice system would fail to address the majority of errors.39 Second, the punitive 
focus of malpractice proceedings serves as a disincentive for health care providers to voluntarily 
                                                 
35Sharpe and Faden, Medical Harm, 215. 
36 Frader, “Mistakes in Medicine,” 120. 
37 Virginia A. Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility for Medical Mistakes,” in Rubin and Zoloth, Margin of 
Error, 187. 
38 Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility,” 187-8. 
39 Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility,” 187. 
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report their own medical errors, near-misses, and adverse events associated with mistakes. Third, 
malpractice settlements require an identifiable party who is responsible for the error (and who 
will pay the awarded compensation); this requirement disregards the system-level problems that 
play a role in many mistakes. Some negligence may indeed be committed by “bad apples” who 
are incompetent or dismissive of the standard of care, but more often a combination of factors 
leads to a breach in the standard of care for which the end-point clinician is not solely 
responsible.40  
 In light of the variety of actions and conditions that have the potential to lead to adverse 
events, it is critical to determine the conditions under which actions or inaction are truly errors. It 
bears repeating that not all adverse events are the result of preventable errors and not all errors 
lead to adverse events. Sharpe notes that designation of an action as a mistake or error depends 
on how the action squares with the obligation of due care:  
Harms associated with recklessness, incompetence, or negligent incapacitation 
(such as when the practitioner is inebriated) are not genuine ‘mistakes,’ since they 
do not result from error per se, but from a disregard for due care itself. When a 
mistake in reasoning, judgment, or action does involve erring from standards of 
due care, however, it is a genuine error and, as such, is presumed to have 
occurred within a context of good faith.41   
According to this rationale, the practitioner may be blameworthy both for actions—or failures to 
act—in disregard of the (legal) duty to care, and for true errors that occur while attempting to 
meet the (medical) standard of care within the context of due care. The practitioner is morally 
blameworthy for harmful actions if she has acted without due regard for the standard of care; 
                                                 
40 Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility,” 186. 
41 Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility,” 184-5. 
  13
however, adverse events that are not the result of negligence or error are not blameworthy 
because there has been no breach of the duty to care. 
 Another factor in determining blameworthiness is the ever-rising standard of care. As 
medical knowledge deepens and technologies improve, the opportunities for successful medical 
intervention expand. The standard of care is elevated as medico-scientific progress provides 
more opportunities to treat more ailments successfully. A failure to implement medically 
beneficial knowledge and technology becomes a culpable error where previously the intervention 
may have been unknown, innovative, or experimental rather than standard. These improvements 
to medical care include preventive practices, such as performing a sponge count before closing a 
surgical site, which become part of the standard surgical checklist; a failure to perform the 
obligatory sponge count is now considered an error rather than an omission of a preventive 
double-check.42 Kenneth DeVille and Carl Elliott note that this phenomenon of the failure to 
implement preventive practices being viewed as error “may help explain why medical error has 
seemingly increased in the United States in the 20th century at the same time that medical 
professionals have almost certainly become better educated, more skillful, and more careful than 
their historical counterparts.”43 The authors conclude that determining error, just like identifying 
disease, “continues to be an amalgam of physiological explanation and social definition.”44 
Consistent with this position is the acknowledgement that there are inherent limitations of 
scientific and clinical knowledge—whether we accept or deny the fact of medical uncertainty 
                                                 
42 Kenneth DeVille and Carl Elliott, “To Err Is Human: American Culture, History, and Medical Error,” in 
Rubin and Zoloth,  Margin of Error, 32. 
43 DeVille and Elliott, “To Err is Human,” 32. 
44 DeVille and Elliott, “To Err is Human,” 33. 
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and subjectivity will affect our process of determining when a mistake has been made and 
whether a cause can be determined, let alone prevented.45
1.2 OFFENSES, WRONGS, AND HARMS 
In this thesis, the words ‘offense’ and ‘wrong’ are both used to describe instances where one’s 
rights have been violated by another or where another has neglected her obligations with regard 
to her treatment of the victim. In a broad sense, the term ‘offense’ can include both trivial and 
profound cases ranging across affronts to one’s senses, shock to one’s sensibilities, 
embarrassment, fear, and humiliation, and can also subsume what we would otherwise term 
‘wrongs.’46 In a narrower sense, an offense is differentiated from a wrong in part because an 
offense is contingent upon the subjective state of mind of a victim who feels wronged by 
someone else (regardless of whether the action was, in fact, inherently wrong or wrong under the 
circumstances), whereas a wrong describes a more objective determination of the violation of a 
right or obligation regardless of the victim’s perception.47 I employ the broader sense of offense 
in this thesis, including wrongs and other minor affronts under the term ‘offense’ and reserving 
the term ‘wrong’ to account specifically for violations of one’s rights and violations of one’s 
obligations to meet a particular standard of conduct. A victim may or may not be aware of 
                                                 
45 Frader, “Mistakes in Medicine,” 120-1. See, also, the summary of Eric Cassell’s argument laid out by 
Tod Chambers, “Framing Our Mistakes,” in Rubin and Zoloth,  Margin of Error, 20-2. 
46 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 2, Offense to Others (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 14-22. 
47 Feinberg writes, “Whereas ‘offense’ in the sense of the offense principle specifies an objective 
condition—the unpleasant mental state must be caused by conduct that really is wrongful—‘offense’ in the strict 
sense of ordinary language specifies a subjective condition—the offending act must be taken by the offended person 
to wrong him whether in fact it does or not. In the strict and narrow sense, I am offended (or ‘take offense’) when (a) 
I suffer a disliked state, and (b) I attribute that state to the wrongful conduct of another, and (c) I resent the other for 
his role in causing me to be in the state.” Offense to Others, 2. 
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having been wronged (e.g. asleep or unconscious while one’s privacy is violated), but 
nonetheless some legal, professional, medical, or ethical principle or standard was violated. The 
wrongs on which I focus in this thesis are failures to adhere to the standard of care and the 
failure, therefore, to fulfill therapeutic obligations to patients. 
 Harm, by contrast, is the “thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest” that leaves 
that interest “in a worse condition than it would otherwise have been in had the invasion not 
occurred at all.”48 Harms may be physical, psychological, economic or other injury to one or 
one’s interests, which may or may not result from the breach of a norm. All relevant norms may 
be met in a particular instance, and harm may still result. For example, a patient may consent to 
surgery, fully understanding that some of her interests (say, freedom from acute physical pain) 
will be harmed as a result. In such a case, however, there would be no wrong precisely because 
all relevant norms, including informed consent, are satisfied. Evidence of harm may be 
immediately appreciable or latent, meaning the victim herself may not be fully aware of the 
damage for some period of time. Moreover, one may be harmed without one ever recognizing or 
appreciating that one is harmed, as in the case where one’s interests are harmed without one’s 
knowledge. Harm to one’s surviving interests, such as an executor’s failure to honor the terms 
laid forth in another’s will, are a clear instance where the victim cannot appreciate the harms 
suffered to her interests.  
Harm may result from a wrong, or it may result from an accident where no one is to 
blame. I may stub my toe while walking up the stairs and suffer physical harm. I may even be 
afraid of ascending stairs in the future due to the psychological effects of the incident. However, 
no wrong was committed against me—I was simply clumsy. Moreover, harm may be the result 
                                                 
48 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 1, Harm to Others (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984), 33-4. 
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of action that meets all relevant standards. Harm may simply be a bad outcome when everything 
that should and could be done was done, and was done correctly. 
With regard to medical error, as has been discussed, not every error or wrong results in 
harm to the patient. Some errors are detected and corrected before they reach the patient, or the 
error may fail to cause the damage it has the potential to. Likewise, not all harm is due to error. 
There are inherent risks associated with most forms of medical care, including diagnostic 
procedures, even when the standard of care is met. The standard of care serves as a benchmark 
for ethical and legal evaluations of medical practice and can help distinguish the occasions where 
legal and/or moral culpability is appropriately assigned. When a medical team meets or exceeds 
the standard of care, and yet the patient suffers some harm (e.g., progression of her aggressive 
cancer despite appropriate interventions), the team is morally and legally blameless for that bad 
outcome or, in this case, the harm she suffers from the progression of her illness. By contrast, a 
caregiver could meet the medical standard of care but fail to demonstrate appropriate respect for 
her patient throughout the course of treatment. Even if no harm is evident, we may still fault the 
caregiver for breaching her ethical duty—if not her medical duty—to her patient. Given that 
people have interests in not being wronged and, in this case, being treated respectfully, we can 
conclude that all instances of wrong at least harm a person in the sense of harming the person’s 
interest in not being wronged, in this case, the patient’s interest in being treated with respect. 
Even if no physical or psychological harm is done by the caregiver’s breach of the duty to 
respect her patient, the patient’s interests are harmed.  
Consider another example of these interrelated concepts. If a physician breaches her duty 
to care and fails to meet the standard of care, we can say that she has acted wrongfully and find 
her blameworthy according to ethical and professional standards. If that failure of her duty also 
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results in compensable harm to the patient, she would also be liable—by legal standards—for 
negligence and, thus, malpractice. Ethical culpability and legal culpability do not adhere to all 
the same criteria, but the standard of care in the medical arena clearly carries implications for 
both. 
1.3 INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
DeVille and Elliott write, “How one explains particular instances of misfortune will inevitably be 
tied to one’s judgment of the socially relevant facts, which are in turn dependent on one’s 
understanding of the way the universe works. […] It reveals notions about blame and 
responsibility, about what might have happened but did not, about the gap between what was 
expected and what was done.”49 Indeed, parsing individual and institutional responsibilities for 
error—and even the designation of an action or event as an error in the first place—reveals our 
assumptions of how we think things ought to be. 
In contrast to the small-town house-calling doctors of yore, in contemporary medical 
contexts, myriad individuals, institutions, and systems cooperate and compete to deliver health 
care. Within this interdependent network of individuals and institutions, assigning responsibility 
for errors and error prevention becomes a tricky task. In these institutions, no person’s roles and 
responsibilities are wholly independent of others’. Every member of a health care institution has 
an effect on others within the institutional structure and culture. Policy decisions made by 
administrators must be implemented accurately and consistently by others at myriad levels of the 
                                                 
49 DeVille and Elliott, “To Err Is Human,” 26. 
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institutional structure and at multiple points in clinical practice. Likewise, the aggregated actions 
of individuals can draw attention to the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the policies of the 
various systems, to which administrators respond with reinforcement or revision of those 
policies.  
Within healthcare institutions, patient care is affected by individuals at all levels: 
physicians, nurses, unit secretaries, technicians, pharmacists, orderlies, janitors, and other 
support staff. 50 Individuals are responsible to follow protocols and policies applicable to their 
roles within the institution. Since healthcare is delivered through complicated coordination of 
dozens of services, vendors, and team members, there exists an interdependency of individuals to 
each other. As I will argue in the third chapter, institutions that operate with a culture of 
responsibility would encourage each individual within the system to be alert to prevent or detect 
their own commission of errors as well as those potentially or actually committed by others. 
Moreover, I shall argue, they must also be alert to conditions that may make such errors more 
likely.  
Within the context of this interdependency, administrators of medical institutions are 
responsible for monitoring the internal activities of the institution and for ensuring that the 
policies and practices of the institution are consistent with the standard of care. Additionally, 
administrators are responsible for the decisions regarding contracts for products, services, and 
personnel in order to meet the quality goals and fiscal needs of the institutions. Sharpe and Faden 
describe institutional responsibility as follows: 
An institutional commitment to providing technical and policy support is essential 
to these efforts [to eliminate system-related sources of risk in the processes of 
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care]. This will involve sophisticated analyses of the processes of care, 
mechanisms such as provider benchmarking and feedback on adverse events, 
computerized surveillance of adverse drug reactions, medication error review, and 
nosocomial infection control.51
The institution’s responsibility to provide safe, high quality patient care as well as a safe 
environment for employees, contractors, and visitors means that it must be attentive to the ways 
in which its initiatives support or stymie the efforts of individual clinicians and support staff to 
pursue their employment responsibilities in an efficient, effective, and safe manner.  
This discussion has already gestured to the argument that common medical errors often 
occur as a result of both institutional and individual factors. Sharpe and Faden note, “Recent 
research reveals that system failure and poor system or job design contribute significantly to 
harmful error by providing the conditions under which error will thrive.”52 Following a “systems 
theory of causation,” institutions may allow or perpetuate error through the processes in place: 
unnecessary variation or complexity in procedures, flawed and inadequate communication 
channels and practices, inadequate training, and tasks or work schedules designed without regard 
for inherent human limitations.53 Medication errors are common in health care; an institution’s 
role in medication error may be its failure to implement a system for recording and tracking 
patient allergies, as well as each specific dose that is administered to a patient, and requiring 
physicians and pharmacists to confirm their performance of double-checks. In this, as well as 
with regard to other aspects of patient care, it is clear that institutional design and leadership 
shape the work environment of the individuals on the front lines. 
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At the same time, however, institutions can maintain unenforceable or prohibitively 
complex policies that, by virtue of their ineffectiveness, jeopardize patient safety and the quality 
of care at that institution. If the recommended practices are considered too complex or onerous 
by the individuals who must implement them, it is likely that individuals will find convenient 
work-arounds (“cutting corners”) in order to accomplish tasks more easily and quickly. Of 
course, these work-around practices frustrate an institution’s efforts to ensure safety and quality 
of care at the same time that the policies on the books can frustrate those who are affected by 
them. Additionally, the administration can foster a climate of defensiveness and secrecy with 
respect to errors and adverse events, thus decreasing the opportunities for the responsible 
individuals and those with whom they work to learn from the experience and improve the quality 
of the care they offer. With regard to medical error, any root cause analysis or ascription of 
blame needs to look beyond the “end” person to examine how interdependencies and systems 
features contributed to or failed to prevent human error farther down the line. 
1.4 JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE 
When discussing issues of error and culpability, one must also consider what constitutes a 
justification or an excuse. Both justifications and excuses are offered in an attempt to establish 
one’s blamelessness for particular actions, but there are significant distinctions between the two. 
When one offers a justification for one’s actions, one accepts responsibility for the actions (or 
failure to act) but claims that those actions (or omissions) “were defensible or permissible on the 
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basis of some countervailing demand or obligation.”54 Moreover, from a legal perspective—or, 
by analogy, an ethical perspective—a justified act is one where “what is done is regarded as 
something which the law [or ethics] does not condemn, or even welcomes.”55 For example, a full 
waiting room of patients seeking care in an emergency department will be triaged based on the 
severity of their condition. Some, whose conditions are not as critical as others’, may endure a 
longer wait before they are seen by physicians, but this would be justified by the principle of 
attending to the sickest patients first—a principle that has utility in the face of the limitations of 
the staff and resources to attend to all those who seek care and that is generally lauded as the 
appropriate approach to emergency medicine. 
By contrast, those who seek to excuse their actions or omissions admit that the behavior 
was wrong but seek to shift or deny non-causal responsibility (or culpability) for their action or 
inaction. In other words, to offer an excuse is to admit that the action “wasn’t a good thing to 
have done, but to argue that it is not quite fair or correct to say baldly ‘X did A.’”56 The nature of 
the actor’s behavior may then be explained with some excusing condition. Legal philosopher H. 
L. A. Hart identifies the psychological state of the accused as the locus of excusing conditions, 
typically including “those forms of lack of knowledge which make action unintentional: lack of 
muscular control which makes it involuntary, subjection to gross forms of coercion by threats, 
and types of mental abnormality, which are believed to render the agent incapable of choice or of 
carrying out what he has chosen to do.”57  The accused may also point to particular features of 
the action or circumstances surrounding it that serve as mitigating factors that should both excuse 
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the act and absolve the agent of responsibility in this situation.58 For example, one may claim 
that one is excused because one was never advised about the proper protocol to follow. In this 
case, ignorance is proffered as the mitigating circumstance that excuses one’s dangerous or 
dissatisfactory performance.59 Similarly, a surgeon’s hand may be temporarily unsteady when 
she unexpectedly hiccups, and we would not find her to blame for negligence or other 
wrongdoing.  
Justifications and excuses are appropriately offered and accepted if—and only if—we 
accept the underlying reasons given in support of their claim. That is, if the competing principle 
or demand offered in justification is considered to be relevant and sufficiently weighty to pose a 
legitimate conflict among putatively right actions, we will accept the justification and consider 
the agent not to be blameworthy. Similarly, if we accept as legitimate and compelling the reasons 
offered as an excuse, we may exonerate the agent of any blame for their actions, or alternately, 
reduce the amount of blame that we attach to the partially excused agent.60 By contrast, if the 
justifying or excusing conditions are not accepted as relevant, legitimate, or compelling, we will 
still assign responsibility—either partial or full—for the action or failure to act to the agent. In 
either case, the reasons offered as justifications and excuses may be a good place to look for 
opportunities to improve the conditions necessary to promote patient safety and prevent harms. 
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1.5 CASE EXAMPLE: JESICA SANTILLAN 
A case of medical error that made international headlines in 2003 serves to illustrate many of the 
concepts discussed thus far and to prepare the reader to evaluate arguments discussed in later 
chapters. For this chapter’s purposes, what follows is a description of the key events in this case 
in light of the concepts already discussed. In later chapters, I address the apologetic responses (or 
lack thereof) offered by the individuals and institutions involved and consider how a different 
ethical approach to the mistakes made might have resulted in different outcomes for the 
individuals and institutions as well as their witnesses in the community. 
Jesica Santillan and her parents immigrated to North Carolina from Mexico in 1999 in 
search of treatment for Jesica’s debilitating restrictive cardiomyopathy, a stiffening of the heart 
muscle that results in decreased blood flow and heart failure.61 On February 7, 2003, after 13 
months on the transplant waiting list, 17-year-old Jesica received a potentially life-saving heart-
lung transplant at Duke University Medical Center. However, the organs transplanted into her 
body were of an incompatible blood type: the donated organs were type A, and Jesica was type 
O. The resulting complications—organ rejection, a seizure, and heart attack—rendered her 
comatose. After several days, a heart and lung of Jesica’s own blood type became available, and 
she received a second transplant on February 20, but her condition did not improve. Jesica 
Santillan was declared brain dead on February 22, fifteen days after the first, bungled, transplant.  
How, at a leading academic medical center in the 21st century United States, could so 
simple and egregious an error have occurred? This example of a “simple” error of a blood type 
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mismatch has a complicated back-story involving multiple organ procurement organizations, the 
recovery team, and the transplant surgeon.62
When a pediatric donor’s heart and lungs became available in Boston, the local organ 
procurement organization, New England Organ Bank (NEOB), ran a match list through the 
United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) and found no local patients awaiting transplantation 
who were suitable matches. Following the organ sharing protocol, the NEOB coordinator 
searched outside the area for other potential recipients and found two at Duke, the only potential 
recipients who seemed to be close enough in both physiological compatibility and geographic 
proximity to receive the organs. Neither of these potential donors was Jesica Santillan. The 
NEOB coordinator contacted Carolina Donor Services (CDS), whose coordinator called Duke’s 
pediatric surgeon, Dr. Jaggers, at home to offer the organs to a pediatric patient (Pt A) from the 
match list. Dr. Jaggers said that Pt A was too sick to receive a transplant at the time but asked 
whether another of his patients (specifically, Jesica Santillan) might be able to have the organs 
instead. Since information on all of his patients was at the hospital, and Dr. Jaggers was at home, 
particular details about Jesica Santillan could not be discussed immediately, but the CDS 
coordinator promised to check with NEOB. When CDS contacted NEOB about the suitability of 
the organs for Jesica, the NEOB coordinator said that Jesica was not on the match list but told 
the CDS coordinator to ask UNOS why. When the CDS coordinator contacted UNOS, he 
misspelled Jesica’s name and erroneously indicated that her blood type was A (her blood type 
was O). The UNOS operator did not see Jesica as a match for the Boston donor’s organs but 
found her on another waiting list. The operator and the CDS coordinator discussed the 
phenomenon of Jesica’s absence from the match list but did not consider a blood type mismatch 
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in their conversation. The CDS coordinator then called an adult cardiac surgeon at Duke to offer 
the organs for Pt B, the second match on the NEOB list, but the surgeon declined. The organs 
were then offered to Dr. Jaggers for Jesica, and he accepted. 
Time is a crucial factor in successful organ transplants. The less time the organs are 
deprived of a blood supply (ischemic time) between the donor body and their transplantation into 
the recipient, the healthier the organs are and the better their chance for successful 
transplantation. Surgery on heart transplant recipients is usually begun while the donor organs 
are in transit so that the recipient is on cardiopulmonary bypass by the time the donated organs 
arrive.63 This was true in Jesica’s case: while the recovery team traveled to Boston to remove the 
organs and collect laboratory data about the quality of the organs, Jesica’s family was called to 
the hospital to begin the transplantation process. The recovery team discussed the laboratory 
findings about the organs with Dr. Jaggers, who confirmed that he would accept the organs. The 
recovery team waited for 45 minutes for the chartered plane to be de-iced in Boston, and Jesica 
was placed on cardiopulmonary bypass in anticipation of the recovery team’s arrival at Duke. 
 Upon their successful transport from Boston to Duke University, the organs were 
successfully grafted into Jesica, the heart began beating, and the surgical team closed her chest. 
Meanwhile, a technician running routine lab tests on the donor blood detected the blood type 
mismatch with the recipient and called the organ procurement coordinator. The coordinator 
called Dr. Jaggers, still in the operating room, to tell him about the blood type incompatibility 
between the donor organs and the recipient. 
Commenting on these events, Charles L. Bosk exhorts, “We should seek to understand 
how a system was designed so that a competent, well-intended individual was permitted or not 
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prevented from making a mistake.”64 While it would be much easier to point fingers at the 
transplant surgeon, we understand that many errors occurred through a combination of 
institutional and individual factors. With this in mind, I turn to analyze the errors that transpired 
over the course of this transplant process. 
While follow-up on Dr. Jaggers’ initial request to use the donated organs for a patient 
other than the specific patient named by CDS was premature in the standard order of organ 
matching, it is not strictly prohibited by UNOS procedures. Typically, an organ procurement 
organization (OPO) follows the UNOS “match list” (a rank-ordered list of potential recipients of 
donor organs) to find a suitable recipient. The match list includes only patient names and not 
specific details about the patients’ conditions that factor into their prioritization on the list. 
UNOS withholds this information in order to make the OPO dependent upon the UNOS system 
of equitable organ allocation rather than the rationales devised by transplant surgeons or OPO 
coordinators. In an alternative process called an “open offer,” an OPO offers a donated organ to a 
transplant center (rather than to a specific patient) and lets the center propose which patient it 
would best match. Due to the scarcity of information on the UNOS match list, the coordinators 
and doctors involved in open offers must deliberate about suitable matches between donor 
organs and potential recipients without the benefit of the same information available to UNOS.65 
In Jesica’s case, her pairing with the donor organs from Boston resulted from what might be 
considered a hybrid or cross between the match list procedures and an open offer; the organs 
were not initially offered openly to Duke, but the two surgeons in charge of the patients on the 
match list rejected the organs offered for those patients because of the physical condition of the 
potential recipients. Competition for scarce organs is great, so the attempt to make use of 
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available organs led the coordinators and surgeons away from the match list to find another 
suitable recipient at the same institution. The system governing organ procurement and 
allocation is based on rules designed to control the flow of information about donors and 
recipients to prevent manipulation of the system and to ensure equitable distribution of scarce 
resources, but one consequence is that the system allows a small chance that blood mismatches 
could occur.66 Thus, a “competent, well-intended individual” was permitted to factor 
significantly in a larger system breakdown.67
Bosk categorizes the series of events as both a systems error and an individual error,68 
and I believe this assessment is correct. Although a double- or triple-check of the patient’s and 
organ’s blood types should have been performed prior to beginning surgery—a failure on the 
part of the surgeon—other individuals also erred. These include the individual CDS coordinator 
who erroneously spelled Jesica’s name and indicated her blood type as A during a conversation 
with UNOS about allocating the organs to Jesica instead a patient from the match list. However, 
Dr. Jaggers is usually accorded the “individual” error rather than sharing the blame with the CDS 
coordinator. According to Richard I. Cook, “the UNOS operator and the CDS coordinator’s 
conversation led the CDS coordinator to believe that the UNOS operator had confirmed that the 
Boston organs were compatible with the Duke patient.”69  This assumption was one of several 
that contributed to the dramatic error. Cook writes, “The accident occurred because a number of 
individually innocuous conditions combined to create the opportunity for the process of 
matching to lead not to a compatible match but to an incompatible one.”70 In this case, the blood 
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type mismatch had devastating results. The errors that contributed to this outcome, however, 
extended well beyond the operating room. This was a case of latent error—root causes with 
delayed effects—that set up the end-stage error committed by the individual or team.71 While the 
individual errors described here are easier to parse than the larger, systemic errors, there is 
greater long-term benefit to adopting a systems perspective toward error. Bosk writes, “In a 
systems perspective, error is not the result of individual negligence, incompetence, or momentary 
lapses: mistakes are viewed instead as a property of poorly designed systems that fail to 
anticipate sources of error and that fail to build in mechanisms for correction.”72 If imperfection 
is an inherent human feature, human systems must identify the opportunities for error and 
minimize the probability of its occurrence and resultant harm. 
By categorizing the events in the Jesica Santillan case according to the key concepts 
discussed in this chapter, those abstract concepts can gain traction and, in turn, provide greater 
nuance to the issues in this controversial case. With regard to the standard of care, the off-list 
organ offer was not contrary to standard practice. However, the failure to check and double-
check the patient’s critical details does constitute a breach of the standard of care. This breach 
occurred a number of times throughout the episode, starting with Dr. Jaggers’s conversation 
from home with the CDS coordinator and continuing through the organ recovery and transplant 
procedures during which Dr. Jaggers (and possibly others on his team) should have confirmed 
and reconfirmed compatibility details.  
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The adverse outcome of organ rejection also resulted in a swift deterioration of Jesica’s 
health, which was not unexpected given the blood type incompatibility. This adverse outcome 
was the result of multiple types of error. There were errors in the process of “matching” the 
donated organs and in treatment decisions made on the basis of both faulty and unconfirmed 
information with inadequate checks and assumptions along the way, as well as likely normative 
errors caused by a doctor’s and team’s heightened emotional commitment to a sympathetic and 
locally publicized patient. The nature and result of these errors qualify them as sentinel events, as 
well: mismatched blood types, the need for additional medical care (including a second heart-
lung transplant), and the hastening of the patient’s death are all reportable events. The iatrogenic 
illness caused by the transplant error included total heart failure and coma, which required 
significant—yet ultimately futile—efforts to reverse the damage. 
Negligence can be determined insofar as the standard practices were not pursued, 
constituting a breach of professional duty that resulted in unquestionable harm to the patient. 
Determining how the patient may have been wronged, however, is more difficult. I cannot 
determine that the patient was ethically wronged because her care team was acting with good 
intentions to benefit her and to minimize harm to her stemming from her underlying condition.  I 
also cannot determine that respect for her personhood or autonomy was violated. Yet insofar as 
every patient is owed the duty of care, or care that meets the standard of care, Jessica was 
wronged in the breach of that duty. In this sense, every act of negligence—a breach of a standard 
of care owed—constitutes a wrong. One may argue that, had the individuals involved been more 
concerned about patient safety, they should have been more careful at every stage in the process. 
Perhaps it is more accurate to say, however, that the extreme desire of a well-intended set of 
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surgeons and organ procurement coordinators to benefit this particular patient resulted in neglect 
for the standard practices that could have prevented the error from occurring. 
With regard to the deflection of blame through justification and excuse, I cannot see that 
there is any justification for the process errors that took place because no countervailing principle 
would override the obligation to ensure the most basic requirement of organ allocation: ensuring 
medical criteria-based compatibility. Furthermore, scarcity of organs and the risk of ischemia to 
available organs do not constitute sufficient “duress” to excuse the hasty actions and erroneous 
judgments in this case. If one is more concerned about implanting organs than properly matching 
organs to their recipients, the potential harm of error outweighs the potential benefit and does not 
excuse those involved from blame. There is no evidence of malicious intent in this case; I believe 
that the team was well-meaning and did not consciously prioritize either self (or institutional) 
interest or organ allocation over the safety of the patient. Rather, several individuals made 
erroneous assumptions about processes beyond their observation and acted within a system that 
allows for such errors to occur, however rarely. 
 
 
In this chapter, I have laid out the key terms and concepts pertaining to medical error and 
the relative blameworthiness of various medical misadventures. I have also introduced the 
example of the organ transplantation case of Jesica Santillan and provided an analysis of the 
events leading to her death along the conceptual lines discussed in the chapter. In the next 
chapter, I turn to the multivalent phenomenon of apology to define and conceptualize it for 
application to the realm of medical error. Further analysis of the Santillan case reveals how the 
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institutions and individuals involved in the debacle responded in the wake of the errors described 
above.
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2.0  THE COMPLEXITIES OF APOLOGIES 
When confronted with the possibility of having committed an error or facing an allegation of 
wrongdoing, individuals and institutions may respond in a variety of ways. Offering justification 
and making excuses were discussed in the previous chapter as approaches that seek to absolve 
the agent of blame by arguing that the action was actually right under the circumstances 
(justification) or that mitigating circumstances shift or remove the blame from the agent 
(excuse). In this chapter, I discuss a response to an allegation of wrongdoing in which the 
speaker accepts responsibility: apology.  
The term apology derives from the Greek apologos, or ‘story’, which serves as the root of 
one of the oldest recognized genres in rhetorical theory: apologia.73 Dating back to Greek 
antiquity, apologia is characterized by speeches of self-defense. The most famous example from 
antiquity is arguably the Apology of Socrates, in which the condemned philosopher spoke on his 
own behalf to Athenian jurors in response to accusations that he had corrupted the youth of 
Athens and had shown disrespect to the gods.74 Socrates’ speech was closer to expressing 
defiance rather than contrition; in this context, the “apology” differs from what we commonly 
recognize as an apology today. It was not until the late 16th century that the verb ‘to apologize’ 
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University Press, 1991), 15. 
74 Plato, “Socrates’ Defense (Apology)” in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 3-26. 
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was used, but still the definition linked it more closely with offering justification for one’s 
actions rather than expressing guilt and remorse.75 The application of the term ‘apology’ to a 
defense is still used, primarily in scholarly and religious contexts, but the common 
understandings and uses of the genre have evolved since its early instantiations.  
The evolution of the term ‘apology’ is not the only source of confusion surrounding the 
concept. Scholars from the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, and psychology have written 
book-length treatments of the topic but do not reach consensus about the appropriate meanings, 
limitations, or even the essential elements of apology. This chapter lays out a working definition 
of apology, drawn from foundational works, in order to conceptualize apology within medical 
contexts as an ethically appropriate response to medical error. At key points, I return to the 
discussion of justification and excuse from the previous chapter in order to differentiate these 
responses to allegations of wrongdoing from apology as an ethically fitting response to medical 
error. 
2.1 DEFINING APOLOGY 
2.1.1 Constitutive Elements 
Writers on the subject of apology offer varying definitions of this seemingly common 
phenomenon. These definitions indicate that apology is made up of components numbering from 
two (fundamentally, “the offender has to be sorry and has to say so”76) to four77 to as many as 
                                                 
75 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 16. 
76 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 36. 
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eleven.78 The definition I offer is derived from these models and is—I trust—sufficiently 
descriptive and simple to serve the purposes of this project. I propose that there are four 
necessary elements in a genuine apology: 1) acknowledgment that a wrong was committed; 2) 
acceptance of responsibility for one’s contribution to that wrong; 3) expression of remorse; 4) 
intent to benefit the victim through the offer of apology. Taken alone, each of these elements is 
insufficient to constitute an apology, but all are necessary for an apology. Furthermore, a genuine 
apology as I define it requires that the apology be offered directly to the person(s) wronged. As 
simple as this definition appears, there is much contained implicitly within each of its elements, 
and so I will elaborate on each of them before moving on to other considerations of apology. The 
criterion of who may receive and accept an apology will be discussed in greater detail in a later 
section. 
 First, the apologizer must acknowledge that a wrong occurred. Without disclosure of the 
wrong, there can be no apology. Necessarily, as a matter of actual interpersonal communicative 
process, this stage involves identifying the victim of the wrong (To whom is the apology 
addressed?) as well as coming to a shared understanding with the victim about the events that 
constitute the wrong (For what is the apology offered?). It may be that the victim and the 
offender do not initially agree upon the nature of the wrong allegedly committed and must 
negotiate a mutually acceptable interpretation of the incident. Although achieving a shared 
understanding of the wrong is not necessary for the apology offered to be a genuine apology—
                                                                                                                                                             
77 Aaron Lazare, On Apology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 35. Lazare lists four parts to the 
apology process: “1) the acknowledgment of the offense; 2) the explanation; 3) various attitudes and behaviors 
including remorse, shame, humility, and sincerity; and 4) reparations.” 
78 Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
28-107. What Smith calls a “categorical apology” consists of eleven elements. I should note, however, that despite 
how much time Smith devotes to explicating the “categorical apology,” he says that he finds it more valuable to 
address the “forms” of apologetic meaning rather than worrying about the binary categorization of whether an 
expression “is” or “is not” an apology. Smith, I Was Wrong, 12. 
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i.e., to fulfill the conceptual and ethical requirements for an apology—achieving such a shared 
understanding is, I argue below, necessary for the apology to be successful. 79 Additionally, this 
stage implicitly acknowledges the norm that was breached and reaffirms the offender’s 
commitment to the norm as well as to viewing the victim as a moral equal. 
 Second, the apologizer must take responsibility for her part in the commission of the 
wrong. Specifically identifying one’s role in an offense indicates that one is not attempting to 
shirk responsibility or shift responsibility to another person. Rather, offering an honest and 
transparent account of one’s culpability demonstrates respect for the victim and continues the 
process of disclosure that must precede contrition. Again, as a practical matter of communicative 
process, in especially complex circumstances it may take days, weeks, or even years for all the 
facts of the case to be discovered; an accurate account of one’s responsibility in wrongdoing may 
be a work in progress while details of the case emerge.  
Third, the apologizer must express remorse for her actions that constituted a breach of a 
norm. Psychologist Aaron Lazare defines remorse as “the deep, painful regret that is part of the 
guilt people experience when they have done something wrong.”80 Without this sense of guilt 
and regret, there can be no apology in the genuine sense.81 Other attitudes related to remorse that 
might factor into an apology include shame, humility, and sincerity.82 While there is no practical 
                                                 
79 If the victim fails to share the apologizer’s understanding of the wrong, she may not accept the apology 
because she will interpret it as being offered for the “wrong wrong.” See Section 2.1.3 for my analysis of genuine, 
successful, and accepted apologies. There, I explain that an apology need not be successful or accepted in order to 
be an apology, i.e., a genuine apology.  
80 Lazare, On Apology, 107. 
81 Nick Smith terms this type of regret “categorical regret”—which he distinguishes from mere regret—
defining categorical regret as “an offender’s recognition that her actions, which caused the harm at issue, constitute a 
moral failure.” This definition is more stringent than mere regret (wishing things were otherwise), which can be 
applied to the actions of others, unpleasant results of following the rules, natural disasters or other events for which 
the person expressing regret is not blameworthy. This definition for mere regret is closer to the sense of ‘sorry’ 
described later in this section than to the sense of remorse my definition requires, which is more akin to Smith’s 
categorical regret. Smith, I Was Wrong, 68. 
82 Lazare, On Apology, 107, 114. 
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“sincerity test” to apply to an apology at the time it is given, expressing remorse implies that, at 
the time the apology is offered, the offender desires not to repeat the wrong or error. This 
implicit forbearance is not, however, a requirement that the apologizer must demonstrate or 
prove her intentions to prevent future offenses; it is only an indication that one would be justified 
in believing that the apologizer wants to behave differently in the future. 
Fourth, the apologizer must intend to benefit the victim (i.e., improve her condition) 
through the offer of an apology. However, one’s intent to benefit another by apologizing does 
not require that the offender believe that any benefits will actually result from the apology, either 
immediately or eventually. An offender may believe, in fact, that nothing she says can undo the 
harm she caused or be a sufficient offering to her victim. Still, this criterion serves to guide the 
rhetorical and behavioral choices of the offender as she prepares to apologize to her victim, 
including the timing, location, content, and medium of the apology (if not face to face), in order 
to maximize the possibility of improving the victim’s condition. The criterion of benevolent 
intent also assures that our standards for a genuine apology do not allow one to discharge their 
ethical duty to apologize merely for their own satisfaction. 
The interdependency of these four elements of apology becomes clearer after elaboration 
of their implied commitments. If a person believes her actions were regrettable but maintains that 
she should not have to take responsibility or be blamed for her behavior, her expression is an 
attempt to excuse her actions. She does not offer an apology because she does not accept 
responsibility for wrongdoing. Similarly, if a person admits responsibility for her behavior and 
argues that her actions were right, she is attempting to justify those actions rather than to 
apologize for them since one need not apologize for right actions. If someone admits a wrong 
occurred and is remorseful without acknowledging personal responsibility, the “apology” fails to 
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make a meaningful link between the apologizer and the victim. This expression is akin to an 
expression of sympathy or empathy rather than an apology because one can only apologize for 
one’s own wrongs. In this case, too, remorse is a misnomer and is better termed regret or 
sadness. Additionally, a disclosure of wrongdoing and personal responsibility without 
demonstrating sincere remorse takes the legs out from under a would-be apology by leaving the 
discourse at the level of disclosure. Worse, it may be a sign that the offender is actually arrogant, 
defiant, or malicious rather than contrite and apologetic.  Finally, without acting with the intent 
to benefit the victim through the offer of apology, an offender may compound the initial harm by 
acting insensitively in the process of trying to discharge her ethical duty to apologize. We would 
consider an apologizer who acts without regard for the feelings and other needs of her victim to 
lack both true remorse and appropriate humility.  
In the above definition of apology, the reader will note that there is no requirement for 
the word ‘sorry’ to be included. Indeed, a genuine apology may be expressed with or without 
using the words ‘sorry’ or ‘apologize.’ One should also note, however, that use of ‘sorry’ does 
not necessarily indicate that an apology is being offered.83 The word ‘sorry’ is also used to 
express empathy84 (“I’m sorry for your loss; I know you really loved your dog.”), to thinly veil 
resentment and hostility (“I’m sorry you’re so touchy. Most people wouldn’t be so easily 
offended!”), and to describe a poor condition (“After weeks of neglect, my yard was in a sorry 
                                                 
83 Nick Smith notes that the “most significant words in an apology [are] ‘I was wrong.’ In the context of 
apologizing, these words express not only a cognitive error but also a moral lapse.” Smith, I Was Wrong, 60. 
84 An example of an “empathic sorry” in the Jesica Santillan case example comes from Dr. Karen Frush, 
who determined along with another doctor that Jesica was brain dead following the second, unsuccessful transplant. 
According to her account: “I told them [Jesica’s family] we were very sorry, but Jesica had died. They did say they 
did not believe that, but I had to tell them the truth. She was dead.” Dr. Frush is never listed among those who bore 
any responsibility for Jesica’s death. Her expression following the diagnosis of brain death is not an admission of 
responsibility for that death but, rather, empathy. Randal C. Archibold, “Focus Shifts to Decisions Made at End of 
Girl’s Life,” New York Times, February 24, 2003, late edition (East Coast), http://proquest.umi.com/ (accessed 
October 7, 2003). 
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state.”). Each of these examples is obviously not an apology, though the second example may be 
an effort to avoid an apology by shifting blame to the interlocutor. 
It will be helpful here to offer a paradigm case of an apology that fulfills the definition 
offered. The following apology, offered by the physician in charge of the patient’s care, may be 
appropriate following a non-life-threatening omission of a medication order for patient: “I was 
supposed to order your anti-nausea medicine to help you feel better, but I got distracted and 
forgot. I’m sorry I was not more attentive to your care.” The first sentence explains the wrong 
(forgetting to order the medicine) and explains who is responsible (the physician). The second 
sentence expresses remorse for the physician’s inattentiveness. Presumably, the physician 
intended the apology to benefit her patient by disclosing information about her condition and 
demonstrating respect for the patient. This apology satisfies our simple definition. In later 
sections of this chapter, however, I will consider what might also be said or done as part of this 
apology to further satisfy the patient’s psychological, physical, and material needs and 
expectations, as well as to allow additional expression from the physician beyond these 
minimum elements. 
2.1.2 Goals of Apology 
People may apologize in order to achieve various goals that may result from apologies. These 
goals may pertain to the offender, the victim, and others, but in any case point to the belief that 
apology can do something through its expression and reception.85 Additionally, the apologizer 
                                                 
85 In this way, an apology is an illocutionary act—a type of speech act. Just as the phrase ‘I do’, offered in 
the appropriate norm-governed setting can result in the marital union of two people, the phrase ‘I am sorry’ (or a 
similar expression of apology) can produce material results when offered under conditions satisfying the norms 
governing apologies. More full discussion of apology as a speech act is beyond the scope of this project, which is 
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may be responding to her own internal pressures, pressure from others, or some combination of 
the two when she decides to offer an apology.86 The call for an apology, then, may come from 
the offender herself, the victim, or interested others who are privy to the wrongdoing. 
First, the apologizer may be motivated to apologize to those whom she has wronged in 
order to relieve her own strong feelings. She may hope to expiate her shame for wrongdoing by 
confessing or coming clean to her victim and, thereby, maintain her own “moral house.” She 
may apologize out of personal or professional conviction that disclosing her wrongdoing and 
expressing remorse is the right thing to do. She may also apologize in order to seek forgiveness 
from her victim on the way to achieving her own personal peace or closure of the episode. 
Though these personal and internally motivated goals of apology may be sought, it does not 
follow that the apology itself must be insincere, unethical, or manipulative. We must simply 
remember that apology has effects on multiple parties and that various motivations to apologize 
may factor into a wrongdoer’s decision to offer an apology. 
Second, an apologizer may be motivated to apologize in response to compelling or 
coercive external factors. Whether to avoid censure and punishment or to improve others’ 
opinions of oneself, the offender who apologizes primarily in response to pressure from others 
seeks to influence how the victim and others think about and act toward her. She may want to 
mitigate the damage to her reputation, avoid retaliation, or avoid the loss of social support.87 For 
example, one’s continued employment may depend on her display of humility in the form of an 
apology to her superior. These externally initiated, self-oriented goals of apology may or may not 
correspond with the offender’s personal convictions; an “apology” offered solely in response to 
                                                                                                                                                             
focused on the ethical requirements of apology. See J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1975). 
86 Lazare, On Apology, 134. 
87 Lazare, On Apology, 145. 
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external pressures does not fulfill the conceptual requirements of an apology, however. In the 
same way, an “apology” offered only as a means to achieve the apologizer’s personal goals of 
closure does not constitute a genuine apology. In both cases, the would-be apologizer lacks true 
remorse for her wrongdoing and does not specifically intend to benefit her victim. The next 
section will discuss in greater detail how remorse affects the ethical value of apology.  
Third, apology may achieve or contribute to goals that pertain to the victim and/or 
witnesses to the offense and apology. These goals may not have personal value to the offender 
but she expects that they will be meaningful to the victim or witnesses. Apology demonstrates a 
respect for others, which may be important for the victim and witnesses to observe of the 
offender (especially presuming the demonstration of respect is authentic). Reestablishing or 
reaffirming the offender’s respect for the offended other, or others in general, may be a step 
toward the offender’s reentry or reacceptance into the social and cultural memberships shared by 
the offender and victim.88 The act of apologizing can thus meet interpersonal and social goals of 
reaffirming and recommitting to the values shared among offender, victim, and their 
community.89 Likewise, receiving an apology may provide some psychological relief for the 
victim who may have been afraid that her suffering was invisible or unimportant to others. The 
victim may feel safer or more secure in her interactions and relationship with the offender after 
receiving explicit confirmation that her offender recognizes previous wrongdoing and is 
remorseful.90 Such psychological relief may contribute to the goal of allowing the victim the 
opportunity to move toward a sense of closure about the wrongdoing, even if such closure is not 
fully achieved until well after the apology is offered. 
                                                 
88 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 22-3, 31. Additionally, Tavuchis refers to “apology’s fundamental tasks of 
reaccrediting membership and stabilizing precarious relations” following a transgression. Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 20. 
89 Lazare, On Apology, 53. 
90 Lazare, On Apology, 59. 
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For the offender and the victim there is another possible goal for apology that deserves 
more sustained attention—namely, forgiveness. The issue of forgiveness factors prominently in 
discourse about apology, and though this thesis cannot give forgiveness the attention it merits, I 
will briefly address the relationship among apology, forgiveness, and—in the next subsection—
the success of apology. Like apology, the concept of forgiveness is both foundational and 
complicated. 
Sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis conceptualizes apology as the “middle term in a moral 
syllogism” that follows a call for apology and is followed by forgiveness.91 Although others may 
argue that forgiveness is not chronologically or conceptually tied to apology in this way,92 it is 
appropriate within this discussion of the goals of apology to consider the offer—or 
withholding—of forgiveness following an apology. 
Forgiveness has ties to religious practices (such as confession, repentance, and atonement) 
that take place between individuals or between a person and God, notably within Judeo-Christian 
traditions. However, we can still understand forgiveness within a secular context as a “process by 
which the offended party or victim relinquishes grudges, feelings of hatred, bitterness, animosity, 
or resentment toward the offender. In addition, the person who forgives forgoes wishes and plans 
for retaliation, revenge, and claims for restitution.”93 In this way, forgiveness is a letting go, a 
detachment from the justifiable feelings of bitterness or wishes for retaliation. Forgiveness may, 
additionally, involve the adoption of positive feelings, such as compassion or love, toward the 
                                                 
91 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 20. 
92 Aaron Lazare considers four formulations of the relationship between apology and forgiveness: “1) 
forgiveness without apology; 2) no forgiveness regardless of the apology; 3) forgiveness that precedes apology; and 
4) apology that precedes forgiveness.” Of these, numbers two and four are most relevant to the present discussion. 
Lazare, On Apology, 231-2. 
93 Lazare, On Apology, 230-1. 
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one who has caused her harm.94 Like apology, the sentiments associated with forgiveness must 
be expressed voluntarily in order to support the moral weight of the gesture. As both an 
emotional and cognitive activity, offering forgiveness involves recognizing the wrongdoing for 
what it is and making a conscious choice to temper one’s thoughts and actions in response to the 
wrongdoing.95 To forgive does not mean to forget the wrongdoing—how would forgoing 
retaliation have meaning in such a case?—nor to pardon the offender, which is the purview of 
the law or other authority.96
When one offers an apology, she offers simply a speech act, asking in return for 
something “exceptional and urgent: nothing less than forgiveness, redemption, and acceptance 
that serve to restore one’s sense of reality and place in a moral order.”97 The power to offer such 
redemption and acceptance through the act of forgiveness belongs to the victim, and the offender 
cannot demand forgiveness from her victim. A sincere apology may create the conditions 
necessary to allow the victim to detach from the wrongdoing through forgiveness of her 
offender, but forgiveness should not be expected as the “right” of the offender in exchange for an 
apology.98 While wrongdoing serves as an occasion for apology, apology is not a sufficient 
condition for forgiveness to be offered.99 Again, for forgiveness to be conceptually and morally 
meaningful, it must be offered voluntarily and in the spirit of restoring the offender and victim to 
wholeness. 
Although forgiveness is a morally weighty process, it does not follow that it is an all or 
nothing phenomenon. A victim may still harbor distrust or some anger toward her offender 
                                                 
94 Lazare, On Apology, 231. 
95 Lazare, On Apology, 231. 
96 Lazare, On Apology, 231. 
97 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 31. 
98 Nancy Berlinger, After Harm: Medical Error and the Ethics of Forgiveness (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
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99 Berlinger, After Harm, 110. 
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despite her detachment from retaliatory impulses. Moreover, she may have more positive 
feelings toward her offender following an apology and may forgive her offender without 
necessarily subjecting herself to possible future harm by the offender. The degree to which 
forgiveness is experienced or even possible may depend on the appropriateness and reception of 
the apology, how inclined the victim is towards forgiveness in general, and how traumatic or 
serious the offense was in the first place.100
With regard to the goals of apology, it makes no sense to advocate apology in response to 
wrongdoing without also subscribing to the possibility and preference for forgiveness over 
retaliation.101 This is not to say that legal or other sanctions should not be sought in some cases 
of wrongdoing, only that it is ethically appropriate to teach and practice apology and forgiveness 
in tandem rather than to leave the “moral syllogism” unsatisfied.102 Indeed, many offenses may 
be most appropriately addressed though administration of legal redress in addition to the 
interpersonal dynamic of apology and forgiveness. However, a victim’s offer of forgiveness does 
not preclude the possibility that other authorities will pursue warranted sanctions through formal 
channels. 
In summary, apology may be offered in pursuit of various goals that have particular 
implications for the offender, the victim, and the witnesses to the wrongdoing and/or apology. 
Achievement of these goals should not be considered dichotomously, but rather along a spectrum 
that allows for great and small shifts of attitude, behavior, and connectedness among individuals 
and groups. These shifts signal some degree of efficacy of apology, dependent on many 
variables, which should not be constrained by an unreasonable standard of perfection to be 
                                                 
100 Lazare, On Apology, 231. 
101 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 34. 
102 Of course, some exceptional instances of wrongdoing may be so traumatic or serious that observers may 
not promote the offer of forgiveness, even as they advocate an apology from the wrongdoer. 
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interpersonally and socially valuable. The next section discusses in greater detail what it means 
to accept an apology and what makes an apology successful, but a non-polar approach to the 
effects of apology is worth introducing here and remembering throughout the forthcoming 
discussion.  
2.1.3  Genuine, Accepted, and Successful Apologies 
Considering the ambiguities of language and the range of responses to wrongdoing, we might 
take a moment to consider what constitutes a real or genuine apology. A genuine apology is one 
that meets the four-part definition described earlier and is offered—without coercion—in a spirit 
of sincere humility and remorse. Additionally, a genuine apology does not seek to cover up the 
offenses committed, soften the culpability of those responsible, nor disregard the suffering of the 
victim. The apologizer proceeds transparently and honestly. As indicated in a previous section, 
there is no clear sincerity test for apology that would indicate to a victim or witness that the 
offender is offering a genuine apology instead of one that refocuses attention from the offender 
as soon as possible. It may be that an apologizer’s sincerity can be assessed more accurately in 
hindsight, given the presence or absence of evidence that the offender has knowingly committed 
similar offenses following the apology. Smith writes, “The ultimate meaning of apologies—like 
the meaning of promises—depends on future behavior and therefore we cannot conclusively 
judge them at the moment they are spoken.”103 Some infraction in the distant future may not 
invalidate the past apology but may contribute to the context in which that apology is 
                                                 
103 Smith, I Was Wrong, 81. 
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considered.104 Still, because it is impossible to know the mental state of the apologizer, it is 
impossible to gauge empirically whether a speech act is a genuine apology, especially at the time 
the apology is offered. Fundamentally, though, we can consider a particular speech act to be an 
apology if it meets the four-part definition. 
Following the call for an apology (by the offender, the victim, or others, as described in 
the previous section) and the apology itself, the “final term in this moral equation is the response 
of the injured party: whether to accept and release by forgiving, to refuse and reject the offender, 
or to acknowledge the apology while deferring a decision.”105 Assessment of an apology’s 
acceptance is a more complicated matter than merely recognizing an apology as such. For a 
victim to accept an apology, she must first recognize it as an apology and then decide how to 
respond.106 At the least, an explicit acceptance signals to the offender that the victim agrees with 
the stated parameters of the apology that has been offered (e.g., the enumeration of the 
wrongs/harms, the offender’s acceptance of responsibility, the identification of the recipient as a 
victim). Beyond this agreement, accepting an apology also indicates a positive shift—however 
slight—of the victim’s attitude toward the offender or about the offense. This shift may not 
necessarily amount to an offer of forgiveness (as described in Tavuchis’s formulation earlier in 
this paragraph), but an apology that is accepted accomplishes some change in the relationship or 
interactions between the interlocutors.  
                                                 
104 Both Smith and Lazare offer the caveat that, in some apology situations, insincerity or other 
contradictions in the offender’s mental state do not necessarily invalidate the meaning that a victim can derive from 
an apology. Lazare, On Apology, 117-18; Smith, I Was Wrong, 24. 
105 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 23. 
106 While this description makes the process appear to be deliberate and rational, I suspect it is often 
subconscious and visceral. In many cases the recipient of the apology simply responds in whatever manner comes 
naturally to her at the time according to an extra-rational assessment of the apology, the offender, and how “struck” 
she is by the whole encounter. 
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As discussed in the previous section on the goals of apology, an apology’s success at 
meeting those goals cannot be determined based on a dichotomous definition. Instead, success 
should be described along a continuum that appreciates subtle changes in interpersonal dynamics 
as a result of an apology. When an offender is readmitted into a social membership—even 
conditionally—following an apology for violating that community’s norms or rules, the apology 
has achieved some success.107 If a victim feels less resentment, vindictiveness, or ill will toward 
her offender following an apology that is presumed to be genuine, we may say that the apology 
was successful to some degree. When a victim responds to an apology by saying, “I accept your 
apology,” she indicates that she recognizes the apology as such and has experience some positive 
shift in her perspective of the offender, however slight. The preceding apology in this case has 
been successful because it was accepted, whether or not forgiveness was granted. 
The victim, as the recipient, is also the only one who can choose to accept or reject an 
apology from the offender or to offer forgiveness to the offender—no surrogate or witness can 
appropriately accept or reject an apology offered to another person. It may be the case that a 
victim prefers not to interact with her offender—including receiving an apology—or it may be 
that the person most wronged and harmed is physically incapable (e.g., is dead or unconscious) 
of receiving an apology. In the first case, an intermediary may be sought to pass along a message 
of apology, but this intermediary is not technically a recipient of the apology.108 In the second 
case, an offender may seek out a family member who shares in the suffering of her loved one and 
direct her apology to the family member as a surrogate recipient. When wrongdoing causes the 
victim’s death, an “apology” to the deceased cannot meet the standard of an exchange between 
                                                 
107 However, the interpersonal goals of apology may still be unsatisfied if the victim herself does not accept 
the apology. 
108 A victim’s desire to avoid further contact with her offender will be discussed in more detail in section 
2.2: “What Warrants an Apology.” 
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moral equals where the offender expresses remorse and the victim chooses to accept or reject the 
apology. However, one may appropriately apologize to the family members of the deceased for 
the specific wrongs committed against them—namely, the failure to fulfill one’s obligation to 
meet the standard of care and, therefore, the resultant death of their loved one. In such a case, the 
family’s interests, as well as the late victim’s interests, have been thwarted, and the offender 
ought to recognize and speak to the resultant harm.109 Whereas justifications and excuses can be 
offered to a third party (e.g., to a witness, accuser, or adjudicator), as well as to the person who 
was allegedly harmed or wronged, apology is appropriately offered only to the victim(s) of the 
wrongdoing. Still, an offender should be mindful of the scope of her wrongdoing and the degree 
to which she has harmed multiple people as a result.  
According to the above explanations, a genuine apology depends on the actions and 
sincerity of the apologizer, whereas an apology’s relative success depends on the mental state of 
and reception by the victim. Therefore, it is possible that one can offer a genuine apology that is 
also unsuccessful. There are many reasons why a victim may not be able to accept an apology 
the first time it is offered—or ever:110 the victim’s general disposition (or not) toward 
forgiveness, a history of abuse or exploitation of the victim (by the offender or more generally), 
the victim’s perception of the gravity of the harm, the victim’s belief that the offender does not 
fully appreciate and acknowledge the degree to which she has hurt the victim, the victim’s 
perception of the offender and/or the apology, and the victim’s fears of being too soft on her 
offender may all factor in to a victim’s rejection of an apology. It may take time for a victim to 
                                                 
109 Joel Feinberg makes the connection between wrongdoing and harm: “One person wrongs another when 
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110 Aaron Lazare discusses the timing and negotiation of apologies—both in relation to the success and 
meanings of apologies—in two chapters of his book, On Apology. 
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be in an emotional and physical state where she can engage with her offender in the process of 
receiving an apology and accepting the apology. Still, to claim that an apology was genuine is to 
consider the offender’s ethical duty to apologize as having been discharged, regardless of the 
apology’s reception. 
Conversely, an apology’s recipient can have the impression that an apology is offered in 
good faith (a “genuine” apology)—and accept it—when, in fact, the apologizer bears some 
resentment about having to be forthright with the victim or otherwise fails to fulfill the four 
conditions of apology. An insincere apology may be accepted by the victim if the offender’s 
deception is convincing, or if the victim cares more about the disclosure of information and 
display of humility than the offender’s actual emotions or assumption of responsibility for the 
incident.111 To the same end, “apologies, genuine or not, can be effective (or regarded as 
successful) when the offender is humiliated and the offended has their dignity restored.”112 
Feigned contrition may be morally offensive or unsatisfactory, but “we are so disturbed by the 
lack of remorse [when others explicitly reject our norms], in fact, that we may find fraudulent 
expressions of remorse more acceptable than its absence, as if we are somehow comforted by 
believing that wrongdoers know the rules of society, even if they choose not to honor them.”113 
Even so, an insincere apology does not bear the moral value of a genuine apology regardless of 
the reception it receives. 
Despite the counterarguments allowing for some degree of feigned contrition, an ethical 
account of apology must require genuine apology as the standard. Offering a would-be apology 
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“begrudgingly, equivocally, or evasively can embrace or compound the initial wrongdoing rather 
than repudiate and correct it.”114 If one goal of apology is to reaffirm and restore moral order 
among persons, offering an ethically bankrupt “apology” flies in the face of this goal and, in fact, 
does not qualify as an apology at all. The genuine apology speaks not only to the mental state of 
the offender, but also to the approach the offender takes towards the moral worth of the victim. A 
genuine apology is an encounter between moral persons where there is explicit regard by the 
offender for the victim as a moral equal; this recognition of the victim’s moral worth can be 
demonstrated simply by acknowledging that the victim deserves an apology because the offender 
“recognizes the victim not as a mere obstacle to the offender’s self-interests but as a moral 
interlocutor who shares values with her.”115 An added benefit of genuine apology is that the 
victim has reason to trust that the offender’s sincere remorse will lead to self-motivated and, one 
hopes, successful efforts to reform.116 In the next section I will address how apologies called for 
by the victim or third parties relate to genuine apologies. 
Clearly, the assessment of apologies is fraught with imperfect inferences and ambiguities. 
Still, in assessing what is required for a genuine and accepted apology, it is the victim’s 
perspective on the apology that is most important and relevant to its acceptance, due to apology’s 
nature as a remorseful response to the one who has been wronged. In the context of evaluating 
apology, reference to the expectations of a “reasonable person” is a useful device. The 
reasonable person standard facilitates the application of the four conceptual criteria for a genuine 
apology to actual situations. Inquiring about what a fictitious, normative “reasonable person” 
would expect or understand permits us to interpret what is meant by—and required of—
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acknowledging wrongdoing, taking responsibility, feeling remorse, and intending to benefit the 
wronged party.  
A wronged person has the right to be treated as a moral equal. Therefore, the offender 
must consider how to convey to the victim an ethical, genuine apology in such a way that the 
victim can recognize it as an apology and choose whether or not to accept it. Offenders offering 
an apology to their victims ought to consider what a reasonable person in their victim’s position 
would want and need to hear in order to understand that they had received a genuine apology. 
The reasonable person standard is applied to other norm-governed contexts, such as disclosure 
for informed consent or discovery of a standard of care in tort law. In the informed consent 
process, for example, a physician is ethically required to address the information and concerns 
that any reasonable person in the patient’s position would have regarding the risks and benefits 
of the proposed intervention. In this way, the reasonable person standard helps protect the patient 
both from the physician’s potential paternalism or manipulation and from an inappropriately 
minimal degree of disclosure that might advantage the professional community. Instead, the 
patient receives disclosure judged appropriate according to a standard reflecting a patient 
perspective. The reasonable person standard provides a benchmark that is not idiosyncratic but 
attends to the dynamics of specific communication contexts. Like informed consent, apology 
takes place between moral equals who experience a disparity of power and information: the 
victim has suffered as a result of the offender’s actions, and the offender has information about 
those actions. In the case of medical error, the power disparity between patient and provider 
compounds even further the imbalance of the offender/victim relationship. Given this imbalance, 
it is all the more important for an apologizer to address her victim as a moral equal and as a 
person with reasonable expectations for a genuine apology. By crafting an apology according to 
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a reasonable person standard, the offender accommodates the needs of the less powerful 
interlocutor in order to help mitigate the relational imbalance. 
As witnesses and analyzers of apology, we may put ourselves in the position of the 
recipient to consider whether a given apology addresses the four components of the definition in 
a way that would satisfy our reasonable expectations and understandings of acknowledging 
wrongdoing, taking responsibility, expressing remorse, and intending to benefit the victim. As 
noted above with regard to future action, the reasonable person—once apologized to—would be 
justified in believing that the offender desires not to repeat the offense in the future, even if the 
offender does not provide proof of such reform. But “if the offender’s intentions do not 
correspond to the victim’s or the community’s expectations, this can seriously damage the 
significance of the apology.”117 For example, if the would-be-apology is laced with expressions 
that aim to excuse or justify the offender’s actions, the victim would have reason to believe that 
the offender is not, in fact, remorseful, and the recipient would not be able to regard the 
expression as a genuine apology according to the reasonable person standard nor be able to 
accept it.  
Additional applications of the reasonable person standard help us to determine which 
speech acts may be eligible for analysis as apologies (whether or not we conclude that they are 
apologies). Use of the reasonable person standard also helps us to understand how and why 
people give accounts of an encounter as an apology per se, even though it fails to rise to the 
standard of an ethical apology. When examining apologies, we can make several distinctions 
with regard to conceptual, epistemological, and psychological perspectives. First, does it satisfy 
the four conceptual conditions for a genuine apology (as far as we can determine)? Second, was 
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the speech act recognized as an apology by the victim? Third, did the speech act result in the 
victim’s change in attitude toward the offender (i.e., was the apology accepted? did the victim 
offer forgiveness or other favorable response?)? As discussed earlier, even a non-genuine 
“apology” may be accepted as a true apology by a victim who is misled by her “apologizing” 
offender. Likewise, an offender may stammer through an explanation or an excuse and still 
explicitly be offered forgiveness by her victim, despite not having offered a genuine apology. 
Conversely, genuine apologies are not always accepted by their recipients. In other words, even a 
genuine apology may not be recognized as an apology, or it may be recognized as such but not 
be accepted or result in forgiveness or other changed psychological state on the part of the 
recipient. The reasonable person standard helps us to understand when one’s ethical duty to 
apologize has been discharged, regardless of whether the victim recognizes or chooses to accept 
the apology. 
Let us return for a moment to our paradigm apology. A reasonable person would surely 
recognize the physician’s expression as an apology, particularly if it were delivered in a manner 
consistent with remorse (e.g., not blurted hastily while rushing by the room or offered in a 
sarcastic tone). Still, a reasonable patient may wonder what the remorseful physician plans to do 
about the missing medication, especially if she is still suffering. In a case like this, the 
physician’s apology may be improved by a statement addressing the patient’s concern: “I was 
supposed to order your anti-nausea medicine to help you feel better, but I got distracted and 
forgot. I’ve ordered the medicine now, and a nurse will be here in a minute to give it to you. I’m 
sorry I was not more attentive to your care.” By stating what the physician has done to 
ameliorate the patient’s suffering, she implicitly expresses that she understands the standard of 
care and is committed to providing high quality care to the patient, despite her previous lapse of 
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attention. Additionally, the physician may choose to offer an empathic statement to explicitly 
recognize how her failure has affected the patient by prolonging the patient’s suffering. She may, 
for example, add: “I’m sorry I was not more attentive to your care and that you’ve been feeling 
crummy because you didn’t get the medicine you needed.” These additions to the apology may 
help witnesses (and the patient) more easily regard it as genuine and may also make the apology 
more palatable to the patient who is then more likely to be able to accept the apology. According 
to our definition of an ethical and genuine apology, as well as a reasonable person’s 
expectations, these additional sentiments should be offered out of the apologizer’s sincerity and 
not solely out of a selfish concern for avoiding negative repercussions.  
2.2 WHAT WARRANTS AN APOLOGY 
Blame for wrongdoing is appropriately attached to an agent in only some cases of alleged 
wrongdoing, as in other instances the agent’s action or behavior may be justified or excused. The 
question that concerns us here is under what circumstances an agent may or must offer an 
apology following wrongdoing and under what circumstances an apology would be 
inappropriate. A priori, our definition of apology requires that a wrongdoing has occurred and 
that the apologizer is able to assume responsibility for some part, if not all, of that wrongdoing. 
With these prerequisites in mind, we must turn to the details that so often complicate accounts of 
apology. 
As discussed earlier, sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis conceptualizes apology as the 
“middle term in a moral syllogism” that follows a call for apology and is followed by 
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forgiveness.118 Having already addressed the issue of forgiveness, let us focus on the “call.” For 
Tavuchis, this is a crucial step: “[U]ntil there is a mutually understood response to a call 
(emanating from the offender, offended, or interested third parties), there is no occasion for an 
apology, and the meaning of the act remains ambiguous or subject to other interpretations.” 119 
Before an apology can be offered there must be a precipitating event as well as recognition of the 
event as an offense to which apology may be an appropriate response. Furthermore, it may be 
neither the victim nor the offender who identifies the need for an apology, though we should 
expect that the offender will internalize the need for the apology by the time she offers it to the 
victim, according to the definition of a genuine apology.  
This call, or recognition of the need for an apology, may develop on the basis of varying 
conditions. Specifically, deontological and consequentialist perspectives motivate people to 
apologize for different reasons. For example, “if we believe that apologies convey deontological 
meaning then we might desire them regardless of whether any living person or group feels 
personally wronged.”120 By contrast, a consequentialist might require or advocate apology only 
in cases where the recipient or a witness can respond in such a way that makes the effort of 
apology worthwhile to the offender, for example by withholding retribution or penalties. If one’s 
apology seems to be offered primarily because one regrets or fears the consequences of getting 
caught or wants to earn the good favor of others—rather than because one feels remorse for the 
“inherent wrongness of an offense” itself—we would characterize the “apology” as non-genuine 
and criticize the offender as being selfishly rather than ethically motivated.121 In this thesis, I 
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take a deontological perspective—though a moderate one—and this position deserves more 
explanation.  
My claim that one has a duty to apologize in certain circumstances follows from the 
obligations not to wrong others that were discussed in the previous chapter, including honoring 
the rights of others and meeting one’s role-based obligations to meet particular standards of care 
or practice. When one violates or fails to uphold these obligations with respect to others, an 
apology may be warranted for partial or complete redress of the wrong committed. The duty to 
apologize is, therefore, consistent with the principle of restorative justice—righting the wrongs 
one commits. 
To clarify this position, let me offer examples from the field of medicine. Clinicians have 
particular obligations stemming from their duty to care, which include meeting the standard of 
care in their treatment of each of their patients. If their actions result in an error that causes harm 
to the patient, they have a moral duty to apologize to the victim of the harm, even if the victim 
may never be aware of the error or the harm.  The extent of the harm may be minor—a 
physician’s delay in visiting the patient because the patient’s chart was misfiled—or it may cause 
increased morbidity and require additional medical care in consequence, as in the case of wrong-
site surgery. The moral obligation to apologize following a harm caused by one’s error is the 
most cut-and-dry exigency. 
A more complicated situation is one where a significant (moral) wrong committed 
appears not to cause harm.122 For example, if a physician permits a trainee to practice performing 
a physical exam on a patient while she’s under anesthesia for colposcopy, there may be no 
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demonstrable harm to the patient in spite of the moral wrongdoing. In this case, the patient did 
not consent to serve as a trainee’s practice case and she did not benefit from the additional exam. 
Although the patient may not know about the wrongdoing—particularly because she does not 
recognize suffering any harm—the attending physician has an ethical obligation to disclose and 
apologize for the unwarranted and unapproved examination. The trainee, too, may be culpable, 
depending on the circumstances. Of course, it may be the case that the patient may be quite 
disturbed to learn about such an infraction as compared to not knowing, but she has a right to 
know about the use to which her body was put and to respond to her physician accordingly. She 
may, for example, respond by distrusting her physician and seeking care by another professional 
with whom who she feels safer and more comfortable. 
 In cases where the wrongdoing is minor and there is no harm—physical, economic, 
psychological, etc.—there is no clear ethical mandate to apologize. This particularly applies to 
so-called near misses, where an error is almost committed or where an error is caught and 
remedied before there are any harmful consequences. For example, if a physician orders the 
wrong dose of a medication but the pharmacist detects and corrects the mistake before the 
medication is administered to the patient, this near miss would not require apology to the patient, 
although the pharmacist and physician would likely need to discuss the event with each other and 
perhaps disclose it to the patient. Whether or not disclosure—and apology—should be made 
likely depends on the magnitude of the departure from standards of practice, the magnitude of 
harm that was (perhaps narrowly) avoided, as well as other features of the “near miss.” In any 
case, one should be careful not to overlook or disregard less obvious harms in order to avoid 
offering an apology that may in fact be warranted. 
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In cases where there is no wrongdoing, including no error that breaches a standard of 
care, there is no ethical reason to apologize. In fact, an apology offered for an unpreventable 
adverse event would be nonsensical and confusing. Tavuchis, for example, claims, “Where an 
actor’s responsibility and intentionality are deemed to be minimal or the consequences as trivial 
or accountable, an apology is superfluous.”123 Instead, an expression of empathy or regret may 
be appropriate and possibly morally required. For example, we may rightly criticize the spouse 
who does not express empathy when his wife’s close friend passes away because his relationship 
to his wife includes some commitment to emotional support. Likewise, the physician who says 
nothing after being unable to remove an entire malignant tumor may be blameworthy for not 
meeting a nontechnical aspect of her duty to care for patients. We expect that in a caring 
relationship it is inappropriate to demonstrate indifference or callousness to the other’s suffering. 
In both of these examples, the person from whom we expect empathic expressions has a 
relationship with the one who is disappointed and hurt, and it is that relationship that grounds the 
moral requirement of empathy.  Without the relational bond, such an expression of empathy is 
not required. Although expression of empathy or sympathy on the part of one who witnesses 
another’s suffering may still be appropriate or supererogatory depending on the circumstances, it 
is the special relationship of caregiver to patient or between spouses that requires expression of 
empathy or sympathy in these cases. 
Physician Michael S. Woods claims that three groups of people may properly compel a 
clinician to apologize by demanding or mandating such an action: patients, patients’ families, 
and healthcare organization administrators. Yet, he cautions that a wrongdoer should take a few 
moments to think through the situation in order to offer a thoughtful apology rather than an 
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inadequate, impulsive apology in the face of confrontation.124 Examining this position in light of 
the Tavuchis model of call-apology-forgiveness, we more appropriately understand that patients, 
patients’ families, or administrators may call for an apology, but the apologizer must internalize 
that call in order to offer a genuine apology. Since remorse cannot be coerced, it makes no sense 
to speak of a coerced genuine apology. Additionally, we tend not to honor—or at least do not 
give full credence to—contracts or confessions derived from coercion. While Smith maintains 
that a coerced apology can serve as a form of punishment of the offender because it forces a 
display of humility and demonstrates the power that an authority holds over the offender,125 it is 
more appropriate to call that expression something other than ‘apology’ due to its insincere and 
forced nature. 
Sometimes, for pragmatic reasons an offender may delay offering an apology until the 
completion of a full investigation of the potential wrongdoing, for example, so that she may 
know the extent of her responsibility. While an accurate account of one’s responsibility is 
important to genuine apology, a prolonged silence from the offender following a call for apology 
may be interpreted by the victim as avoidance, denial of responsibility, or heartlessness. Still, 
when one is relatively certain that she played a role in harming another, she should speak to what 
she knows in an apology and leave open the possibility of offering a more comprehensive 
account in a subsequent apology or disclosure when more details are known. 
Finally, it is important to note that the ethical duty to apologize for wrongdoing is not 
absolute. There may be empirical conditions that create an ethical duty not to apologize. 
Consider, for example, a victim who has expressed her strong desire not to see or correspond 
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with her offender. If the offender continued to pursue an apology encounter with her victim, she 
would be violating the victim’s expressed wish to be free of continued trauma from her offender. 
In cases where an offender’s apology (or attempted apology) is expected to cause harm, distress, 
or other harm to the victim, the offender has an ethical duty not to apologize. The expectation of 
harm resulting from apology must not simply be derived from the offender’s fears of facing her 
victim, but should be based upon the expressed wishes of the victim or the reliable account of 
mutual acquaintances that further communication or other encounters between the offender and 
the victim would be most unwelcome by the victim. In the absence of an explicit appeal to avoid 
contact with the offender, the determination of one’s duty not to apologize should be consistent 
with the judgment of a fictitious, normative reasonable person. 
In summary, apology is called for when one has committed a wrong that causes harm to 
another person or that person’s interests. If a wrong is committed that does not appear to result in 
harm, an apology may still be warranted; the situation may require further discussion between 
the wronged person and the offender to achieve a mutually satisfactory understanding of the 
situation and the appropriate response by the wrongdoer. 126 Near misses (errors that are 
corrected prior to being harmful) and harms that result from non-blameworthy causes do not 
require apology, though one might appropriately express empathy for another suffering an 
adverse medical outcome from an unpreventable accident or even a bad outcome that results 
from appropriate care. In these circumstances, the potential empathizer’s relationship with the 
sufferer will bear on her moral duty to provide that kind of emotional support. In any case of 
apology, we can determine whether an offender’s apologetic speech act indeed qualifies as a 
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fulfillment of her ethical duty to apologize according to the reasonable person standard: if the 
speech act fulfills the four conceptual conditions described herein and if a hypothetical 
“reasonable person” would recognize the utterance as a genuine apology and would be able to 
accept it as such, we recognize the apologizer’s ethical duty as having been discharged even if 
the victim does not accept the apology. Finally, the potential apologizer should use good 
judgment regarding whether or how to proceed with offering an apology. The reasonable person 
standard helps us understand in which exceptional cases the victim may be more traumatized by 
additional contact with her offender than by the absence of an apology. Likewise, the rhetorical 
and behavioral choices of an apologizer should be driven not only by the four conceptual criteria 
but also by consideration of what a reasonable person in the victim’s position would expect 
(normatively and epistemologically) of a genuine apology. 
2.3 APOLOGIZING ON BEHALF OF OTHERS 
To this point, the discussion of apology has largely referred to apologies offered by individuals 
in response to their own wrongdoing. However, our earlier discussion about medical practice and 
medical error reminds us that individuals act neither purely independently nor in isolation in 
modern medical practice; responsibility for error may be shared among many individuals 
throughout an institution. Within the context of apology, this understanding of interdependence 
and responsibility leads us to the question: Who can give an apology?  
The legal notion of “standing” provides a good starting place for determining who may 
apologize and for what. Standing is “a procedural requirement ensuring that only legitimate 
disputants adjudicate claims and that random parties cannot bring actions simply because they 
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may hold an intellectual interest in the outcome.”127 In the earlier discussion about genuine 
apologies, I asserted that the offender must offer genuine apologies to the correct victim. In the 
language of standing, we can now say that an offender with standing to apologize offers a 
genuine apology to a victim with standing to receive the apology. That is, the person offering the 
apology must be able to identify her own causal responsibility for the wrong to particular 
victim(s), who must be identified as the “correct” victims to receive the apology based on their 
having been wronged by that offender.  
Additionally, there are cases where one has vicarious responsibility for harms caused by 
particular others, as parents may have for their small children and employers may have for their 
employees. The nature of such vicarious responsibility “means that they are agent-responsible, in 
a forward-looking sense, for the state of the world that is free of harm caused by these children 
or employees, and agent-responsible, in a backward-looking sense, for harm the children or 
employees do cause. In these cases of vicarious responsibility, those who are responsible for the 
harm are not those who have caused it.”128 If a supervisor asks her subordinate to administer an 
incorrect dosage of medication to a patient, the supervisor has responsibility for the error even 
though she did not personally administer the dose; the subordinate acted as the agent of the 
supervisor. In such a case, the supervisor would have standing to apologize for her responsibility 
in the error because, but for her instructions, the subordinate would not have administered the 
erroneous dose. In cases where the one committing the wrong was acting as an agent of another 
(e.g., performing an action at the behest of another), the responsibility for the wrong and 
standing for the apology belongs to the authority on whose behalf the wrong was committed. 
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Had the subordinate acted independently in her administration of an incorrect dose, the 
supervisor would not have standing to apologize for the error on the subordinate’s behalf. 
However, if the supervisor (or parent) had failed to discharge her duties or obligations 
appropriately, thereby causing or failing to prevent the wrong (e.g., by failing to prevent the 
subordinate from acting), the supervisor has standing to apologize for her own failings that 
contributed to the ultimate harm.  
In one’s role as employer, supervisor, or parent, one may be liable for damages caused by 
those within one’s responsibility or influence. If my child breaks a neighbor’s window while 
playing catch in the yard, I would be responsible to compensate my neighbor for the damage 
regardless of whether I failed in any parental or neighborly duty to prevent such damage. 
Likewise, a hospital may be responsible to compensate a victim of medical error committed by a 
member of the hospital’s staff even if proper safety policies were in place. Just as one may 
compensate a victim without accepting fault for the events that caused the harm, one may be 
liable to compensate (or liable to legal responsibility) without having the standing to apologize. 
Since I am responsible for my child, I might try to apologize to my neighbor for damage my 
child caused, but the child—not I—has the standing to apologize for her own error or 
recklessness; an apology from me would be inappropriate. If I was indeed negligent, perhaps by 
failing in my parental duties to teach my child due care, then I both have standing to apologize 
for my wrongdoing and responsibility to ameliorate the harm that resulted.129 Responsibility to 
compensate for those harms is separate from both the ethical requirement for an apology and 
having the requisite standing to apologize. However, an apology would be inappropriate in cases 
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where there has been no wrongdoing (e.g., an adverse event) even if compensation is offered to 
the person harmed. 
To say that one is apologizing on behalf of another might indicate to the victim that the 
speaker recognizes the wrong committed against her and demonstrate the speaker’s empathy, but 
it does not make sense as a genuine apology without the personal acceptance of blame and 
responsibility, as well as a personal expression of remorse and not merely regret for the 
circumstances. Likewise, it does not make sense for a third party to accept an apology offered to 
another. The stipulation of standing does not limit the number of people who may be found 
blameworthy for an offense and, therefore, eligible and responsible to offer an apology, nor does 
it limit the number of people who may be counted among the victims awaiting an apology.130 
Standing, as it applies to ethical apology, requires that we account for and identify the agents 
most relevantly involved in an offense so that a genuine apology is offered by the blameworthy 
individuals for their own actions. 
In addition to this basic sense of apology as an individual apology, a great deal of 
literature deals with what is variously termed organizational, corporate, collective, or 
institutional apology. We may define institutional apology as an expression offered by an 
institution (through a spokesperson or media release) or an individual within the institution who 
responds to alleged wrongdoing by the institution as a whole or select individuals or groups 
acting within their institutional roles. However, while these expressions are called ‘apologies’ by 
witnesses, media reports, and theoretical literature, they do not satisfy all four criteria for 
genuine apology as defined in this thesis. For the purposes of this section, it will be convenient to 
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use the broadly accepted terminology of ‘institutional apology,’131 though I will explain why this 
is, in most cases, a misnomer. In this section, I will briefly consider three variations of 
“apologies” that involve institutions and explain what differentiates these so-called institutional 
apologies from interpersonal individual apologies. 
One version of an institutional apology is an individual apologizing on behalf of her 
institution, what I call the “non-representative institutional apology.” This individual has not 
been delegated the authority of an institutional representative by her institution, but she speaks 
on behalf of the collective nonetheless. The apologizer may be an employee or member of the 
institution who is ashamed of some institutional policy or practice. However, this would-be 
apologizer lacks standing to apologize for the institution, and her remarks may even be 
repudiated by the institution. The victim(s), too, may be dissatisfied by the speaker’s lack of 
standing and authority to offer an apology. The non-representative institutional apology is the 
most tenuous of the three institutional apologies discussed here. Tavuchis puts it more firmly: 
“[A]n apology proffered without the proper credentials, that is, lacking the moral imprimatur of 
the group, amounts to no apology at all. It means nothing because it represents the unaccredited 
One and not the mandate of the Many.”132 The non-representative may better be considered as 
expressing shame or embarrassment because of one’s association with wrongdoers, as well as 
sympathy or empathy with the victim. 
A second form of institutional apology is offered by an institutional representative on 
behalf of an employee or member of the institution. The “representative/individual apology” 
affixes blame on an individual within the institution and offers an apology for that individual’s 
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actions. The responsible agent may be unwilling or unavailable to offer an apology, or the 
institution may want to control what statements are made publicly by members of the institution. 
Here again, the issue of standing casts light on the conceptual failings of such an apology; the 
institutional representative’s lack of standing significantly diminishes the apologetic meaning of 
such an expression, particularly if the responsible person is unrepentant and refuses to apologize. 
Although someone in authority in the institution has delegated responsibility for the apology to 
the representative (who may be an executive, public relations officer, or department head, for 
example), the culpable person may not have authorized the delegation and, in any case, the 
speaker cannot express remorse for another’s actions. Smith offers one reason that an apology-
by-proxy may be acceptable to the victim, however: “In some cases, victims may be entirely 
uninterested in whether the apologizing party possesses standing to speak on behalf of the 
wrongdoers. If the victim is primarily concerned with an institution revising a policy or 
providing redress, a ranking member may be much better positioned to generate this meaning 
than those directly responsible for the harm.”133 According to Smith’s caveat, the victim accepts 
the replacement of genuine apology with redress and/or reform, but the apologetic meaning and 
ethical value is still largely lost. 
The third form of institutional apology relevant here is offered by an institutional 
representative for the institution’s failings. This “representative/collective apology” makes use of 
the same types of spokespersons as the representative/individual apology, but this representative 
purportedly speaks on behalf of the institution as a whole. The representative/collective apology 
is commonly offered following events that are publicly embarrassing to the institution or 
following an accusation of wrongdoing that is considered sufficiently severe or endemic to the 
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institution that a collective apology is considered warranted. The critical conceptual concern with 
regard to this form of apology is not standing so much as the issue of collective responsibility.  
Genuine collective remorse and apology can only be expressed and offered in cases 
where the collective is extremely cohesive, like-minded, and “bound by considerable solidarity,” 
and where each and every member is able and willing to express personal responsibility and 
remorse for wrongdoing.134 Since an institution or collective meeting these requirements is 
extremely rare, we should be suspicious of apologies by institutional representatives that are 
offered on behalf of the “institution” in an abstract sense rather than offered by identifiable 
individuals for their particular roles in the wrongdoing. A problem with collective apologies is 
that they “allow wrongdoers to diffuse blame into the ether of institutional doublespeak,” rather 
than ensure that all responsible will be included in the apology.135 It is ethically preferable for 
each of the culpable agents to offer an apology rather than allow the institution to obscure the 
details of the wrongdoing because “collective apologies often serve as poor substitutes for 
categorical apologies from individual members of the group even if they can provide important 
meanings as supplements to individual apologies.”136 The additional “important meanings” of 
collective apologies may hold significance for interested third parties in addition to the victim(s); 
these additional meanings or uses of collective apologies include establishing the historical 
record of the events and the apology,137 endorsing particular values,138 and rehabilitating the 
institution’s identity in the public eye.139 One can see, however, that these important functions of 
institutional “apology” need not derive from explicit, anthropomorphized statements 
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acknowledging collective wrongdoing or expressing remorse. The ethical import of apology is 
compromised in significant ways by its translation into institutional applications.140
In addition to the elements described above, institutional apologies vary from individual 
apologies in other ways. First, the apologizer in an institutional apology is not necessarily an 
agent significantly responsible for the wrongdoing at issue. We have already discussed how an 
apology-by-proxy is unacceptable according to the criteria of genuine individual apologies, but 
institutions tend to offer such apologies without considering the logical and ethical problems 
inherent in such an arrangement. The voice of the institutional apology may be either an 
abstraction of the institution (issued as a press release, for example) or a spokesperson speaking 
on the institution’s behalf. The apologizer may even be the head of the institution apologizing for 
the offenses of past administrations.141 In any case, the voice of the apology is dissociated from 
the agent(s) of the wrongdoing. 
The “absence of legal and ontological equivalence between the parties” involved in 
institutional apologies differentiates them from interpersonal, individual apologies and raises 
complications for how we might consider institutional apologies and the “nature of the 
Many.”142 But “collectivities can, do, and at times, must apologize to persons they have harmed, 
in a manner of speaking.”143 The constraints of this “manner of speaking” deserve explanation. 
First, institutional apologies tend to be more formal, indirect, and allusive as compared to 
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individual apologies.144 Perhaps because institutional apologies usually become part of the 
historical record and perhaps because some institutional “apologies” are crafted in such a way as 
to abstract from and occlude the specifics of the wrongdoing to which it responds, institutional 
apologies leave little to no room for the spontaneity and dynamics of human conversation. The 
formality of the language can shield the institutional representative from being candid or direct, 
or prevent her from admitting more responsibility than officials might want to acknowledge, and 
this poses ethical and conceptual problems. Such an apology may not meet the reasonable person 
standard if the apology seems designed to be vague or opaque. If one may reasonably be left 
wondering whether the institutional statement was an apology, then we may assume that it fails 
to meet either the reasonable person standard or the four conceptual criteria, for genuine 
apologies. 
Second, collective apologies tend to be offered to multiple and wider audiences than 
individual apologies. A collective apology may explicitly or implicitly address concerned third 
parties, a broader community, and the history and legacy of the institution in addition to the 
specific victim(s).145 For an institution, allegations of wrongdoing may have higher stakes than 
allegations against an individual, therefore the purposes of such an apology extend beyond 
redressing wrongs between offenders and victims and work to rehabilitate the collective’s 
reputation and reaffirm its values to members and non-members alike. An institutional apology is 
likely to be more complex than our four-component definition of apology in order to address 
these other motives and concerns, incorporating additional elements that may not be 
recognizable as apologetic by our “reasonable person.” 
                                                 
144 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 97, 100. 
145 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 97. 
  69
But what are institutional members apologizing for? An apology may be warranted for 
faulty or unethical policies that may be unsatisfactory for several reasons. The policies may be 
ineffective (e.g., may not adequately prevent harm to others), unenforceable or unclear about 
who is to enforce them, unnecessarily complex, vague or loophole-ridden, or contradictory with 
current laws and policies, or they may refer to an abstract goal without specifying implementable 
procedures. Additionally, policies may be unethical because they are discriminatory, infringe 
unnecessarily upon others’ rights and interests, impose an unfair burden on a particular group, 
require that which is itself unethical, or otherwise disregard the status of others as moral beings.  
If the alleged wrongdoing is the poor or inadequate implementation of institutional 
policies, an institutional apology is essentially an apology for the behavior of others, which is 
ethically inappropriate. Only the culpable individuals, rather than institutional proxies who lack 
the appropriate standing, may appropriately offer an apology. When an apology for institutional 
policy is warranted it would be best offered by the policy framers or those who have allowed the 
policy to remain in effect, rather than by an institutional representative who offers a diffuse and 
impotent apology for the institution at large or for others’ misdeeds.  
While much more could be said about the way that institutional apologies are used and 
received in the public sphere, it will suffice at this point to wrap up the observations and 
criticisms discussed thus far, and to relate these to the claim that animates this project. In our 
complex medical systems, apology is an ethically reasonable and appropriate response to errors 
and wrongs committed by individuals, especially if the wrongs or errors result in harm. 
Furthermore, the individuals who may appropriately be found blameworthy for the occurrence of 
error and the commission of wrongs include both clinicians and administrators. We can 
recognize a difference in practice between wrongs one commits directly and wrongs one 
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commits through a failure to institute and maintain policies and systems—acted upon, by, and 
through others—designed to promote safety and prevent error. Ethically, however, there is no 
difference in blameworthiness between the clinical and administrative wrongs insofar as both 
warrant an apology offered from the individuals with agency in their realms of responsibility to 
the victim(s) affected by the failure to provide the standard of care and the neglect of moral 
norms. While “institutional apologies” offered by representatives on behalf of individuals or, 
more often, a whole institution are commonly accepted and evaluated as apologies in the media 
and the public eye, this analysis raises concerns about the conceptual and ethical disconnections 
between the institutional rhetoric and what we understand a genuine apology to entail. In light of 
these conceptual and ethical concerns, we can regard the three formulations of institutional 
apology discussed in this section as falling short of the criteria for genuine apologies. Instead, 
apologies can appropriately be offered only by individuals for their own institutional role-related 
actions. 
2.4 RELATED BEHAVIORS 
In addition to apology—or instead of apology—there are other actions an individual or 
institution may take in response to wrongdoing. Indeed, in light of the previous discussion, these 
related behaviors are more reasonable for an institution to offer than an apology. For example, an 
institution may offer compensation to mend the damage done and/or make pledges to reform 
policies and future practices to prevent the recurrence of the wrong committed. These actions do 
not constitute an apology on their own, but may supplement or take the place of apology in some 
cases. We must be sure to differentiate these related behaviors from the essence of apology in 
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order to avoid confusion about claims and policies regarding apology, especially as they pertain 
to institutions. To that end, this section addresses the question: What is the relationship, or rather 
lack of conceptual relationship, between provision of an apology, provision of compensation, 
and pledges to reform future practices/behavior? 
Apology, according to our definition, does not require the provision of tangible 
compensation to victims or their families. An offender might demonstrate her sincerity and 
commitment to making the victim whole by offering reparations for the harm caused by her 
wrongdoing, but the absence of compensation does not disqualify an apology from being 
genuine. Moreover, compensation for harm does not indicate remorse for the wrongdoing. 
Institutions or individuals sometimes offer compensation to a victim without acknowledging 
fault or liability (or apologizing), as in legal settlements. Again, these behaviors are sometimes 
interpreted as acknowledgment of guilt or remorse, but they are not apologetic expressions per 
se. Just as one may offer disclosure of an error without apologizing, one can also withhold 
apology while still disclosing and offering compensation for harms. One reason for offering 
compensation without taking responsibility for the harm is that one may have a duty to care for 
others—regardless of the cause of their injuries—because “we can distinguish between 
responsibilities to redress injuries we cause and for which we should accept blame and duties to 
care for those harmed by others.”146 In either case, the provision of redress for harms does not 
constitute an apology. In our paradigm apology case, the physician could have ordered the 
patient’s anti-nausea medication as soon as she realized her previous failure to do so, without 
ever apologizing to the patient; furthermore, we would judge the physician to be negligent, 
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reckless, or even intentionally culpable if she had not tried to right her wrong, whether or not she 
offered an apology to the patient. 
Apology also does not require a wrongdoer to pledge a change in behavior or a shift in 
policy to affect future actions. Like an offer of compensation, an offender may take specific 
actions toward preventing a recurrence of the wrong that precipitated the apology both in order 
to show sincere remorse and to prevent future wrongs. Still, the apologizer is not required to 
offer an explicit promise to take steps to avoid repeating the wrong. Conversely, an offender can 
make a specific effort to avoid wronging and harming others in the future without offering an 
apology for a particular wrong already committed. However, a genuine apology cannot be paired 
with an offender’s implicit or explicit expression that her behavior won’t change or that, in 
retrospect, the offender would have behaved precisely the same way if given the chance. 
Without diverting to an exhaustive discussion of all the ways in which one might 
invalidate or compromise an apology through one’s behavioral and attitudinal expressions, it 
bears repeating that the reasonable person standard is useful in making such determinations.  We 
can employ the criteria of this standard in order to parse which behaviors are appropriately 
apologetic and which would seem to undermine an apology. In the example above where the 
physician failed to order the anti-nausea medication, even after apologizing for doing so, a 
reasonable person would doubt the sincerity of the physician’s apology for being distracted and 
forgetful. Likewise, if the physician appeared to be distracted or hurried while she offered her 
apology, we would judge that apology to fall short of fulfilling the criteria set out by a reasonable 
person standard for apology. We recognize that many behaviors, including antagonistic or 
careless behavior, are incompatible with what a reasonable person would expect in the presence 
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of true remorse, and thus such behaviors and attitudes invalidate or undermine the would-be 
apology. 
2.5 APOLOGIES AND RESPONSES TO ERROR IN THE SANTILLAN CASE 
Armed with a better understanding of what offenses warrant an apology and who may apologize 
for what offenses, we return to the case of Jesica Santillan and the error-ridden heart-lung 
transplant performed by Dr. Jaggers at Duke University Hospital to examine and analyze the 
individual and institutional responses to the errors that have been recorded publicly. According 
to the analysis in this chapter, the transplantation error is one for which apology is warranted 
because it was a preventable error that resulted in harm. Moreover, there are identifiable agents 
in the series of events who were responsible for the miscommunications and mix-ups. In this 
section, I offer a critique of three primary statements offered by Dr. Jaggers, Duke University 
Hospital CEO Dr. Fulkerson, and Duke University. 
Following the revelation of the blood type mismatch in Jesica Santillan’s heart-lung 
transplant, the already well-publicized case of a life-extending transplant was transformed into a 
national and international story of an unthinkable error at a top medical center. Naturally, the 
media firestorm required public statements from the hospital and the surgeon in addition to 
whatever private interactions occurred among hospital administrators, the transplant team, and 
the Santillan family. Many of these statements have been published in local and national 
newspapers as well as on Duke’s website. 
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2.5.1 Public Statement from the Transplant Surgeon 
A statement from Dr. James Jaggers, the transplant surgeon, was released to the media on 
February 22, 2003. In it, Dr. Jaggers said: 
Today our focus is on the Santillan family. Our heart goes out to them as we 
mourn the loss of Jesica. […] This process of organ donation is a very 
complicated one—one in which there's many institutions, many organizations, 
and many steps. At each step, there is an individual, and individuals can make 
mistakes. Unfortunately in this case, a mistake was made. 
 As Jesica's surgeon, I take responsibility for those errors and I take 
responsibility for the entire team. After the first transplant, I spoke to Jesica's 
family and told them of this error, but then I did everything possible to save 
Jesica's life, including another heart and lung transplant. Many people at Duke 
aided me in this process, including the pediatric ICU staff and the other transplant 
surgeons. 
 I know that everybody at Duke was behind us. I know that everybody at 
Duke mourns the loss of Jesica. I hope that we and others as we go through this 
process can make it a safer one, and one that will benefit even more patients. One 
that will encourage organ donation. To do otherwise would dishonor Jesica and 
dishonor her memory.147
The statement opens with an expression of empathy for and sympathy with the Santillan family, 
and includes Dr. Jaggers among the mourners for Jesica. These expressions and his inclusion of 
                                                 
147 Duke Medicine News and Communications, “Statement from Dr. James Jaggers Concerning Jesica 
Santillan,” February 22, 2003, http://www.dukehealth.org/HealthLibrary/News/6421 (accessed October 8, 2008). 
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himself among those who mourn are appropriate regardless of Dr. Jaggers’s specific errors in the 
case; indeed, as Jesica’s caregiver, Dr. Jaggers would appropriately mourn her death. Members 
of the hospital staff, the media, and the broader community shared similar feelings of sorrow, 
sympathy, and even loss. But we look to this statement not for a reflection of public sentiment 
but for insights into the mind of the surgeon at the center of the controversy. 
After a very brief account (omitted above) of Jesica’s need for heart and lung transplants 
and the nationwide tragedy that thousands of potential organ recipients die before they can 
receive the necessary organs, Dr. Jaggers speaks to the complexity of the organ transplantation 
process and the potential for error amid this complexity. While he acknowledged that an error 
occurred within the complex system of coordinated individuals, Dr. Jaggers gave no specifics 
beyond saying, passively, that “a mistake was made.” Immediately following, Dr. Jaggers 
directly “[took] responsibility for those errors and […] for the entire team.”  
While he accepted ultimate responsibility, we may wonder from this statement just what 
part he played in the commission of an error. In medical culture, the attending surgeon bears a 
role-related responsibility for any errors that occur “on his watch” and Dr. Jaggers, as the 
attending surgeon, took responsibility for the errors in Jesica’s care. However, those involved in 
the matching, procurement, and transplantation of unsuitable organs extended beyond those on 
Dr. Jaggers’s surgical transplant team. Others involved in organ transplantation include the 
coordinators in the transplant department; coordinators at the various organ procurement 
organizations (OPOs) involved in the geographic regions of the donor and recipient; a 
procurement team (including a transplant surgeon) that travels to remove and retrieve the 
donated organs; a transplant fellow (in Jesica’s case, specifically); and the transplant team itself, 
which includes the attending surgeon, other assisting surgeon or surgical fellows, nurses, and 
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anesthesiologists. As the attending surgeon, Dr. Jaggers oversaw the efforts of the surgical teams 
(the procurement team and the transplant team), though he was not a supervisor to the OPO 
coordinators. Disclosure about the communication errors and lack of redundant verification in 
the transplantation mix-up had been made by Duke spokespersons to the media already, so Dr. 
Jaggers’s stated acceptance of responsibility for the errors (note his use of the plural) implicitly 
accepts the published accounts. But Dr. Jaggers took responsibility for his errors as well as for 
those of the entire transplant team. This presumably means that he accepted responsibility for the 
transplant fellow’s failure to communicate the donor organs’ blood type to the rest of the 
transplant team, including Dr. Jaggers himself, and for the failure of the rest of the procurement 
team to do so. It is unclear whether he also intended to take responsibility for the recording mix-
ups of Jesica’s blood type and name spelling that occurred at CDS or for the failure by the CDS 
coordinator to specifically request Jesica’s blood type and compare it to the blood type of the 
donor organs. However, it does not seem appropriate to assign blame to Dr. Jaggers for the 
combined individual omissions of others even if they were associated with his omissions. Still, 
Dr. Jaggers claimed responsibility, vaguely, for all of the errors.  
While he mentioned having a conversation with the Santillan family, he did not 
specifically mention whether he apologized to them. This omission may have been out of respect 
for the Santillan family’s privacy, or perhaps out of a personal desire not to dwell any longer on 
his admission of wrongdoing. There is no public record of what Dr. Jaggers said to the Santillan 
family when he disclosed the error to them, so we must limit our assessment of his responses to 
recorded public statements. 
Dr. Jaggers stated that, following the error, he “did everything possible to save Jesica's 
life, including another heart and lung transplant.” In so doing he expressed his professional 
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dedication to Jesica’s care, despite the lapse that occurred previously. While Dr. Jaggers deserves 
no extraordinary praise for doing his job (which included trying to save Jesica’s life), he may 
have used this statement and the evidence of his continued efforts in order to reassure others that 
he had no intent to harm Jesica and that, in fact, he was a very dedicated physician. He also 
shared credit for these efforts with other members of the hospital staff involved in Jesica’s care. 
His sweeping comments that “everyone at Duke” was behind his team and mourned Jesica would 
be unacceptably broad claims if taken literally, but the hyperbole may be acceptable in this 
context where expressions of solidarity and empathy are called for by the rhetorical situation. 
The statement closes with a forward-looking expectation, phrased as a hope, that lessons 
learned from the debacle would lead to safer patient care in the future, not only by Dr. Jaggers’s 
team but also by those who witnessed or heard about the events at Duke. Dr. Jaggers expresses 
the goal of increased safety and organ donation as an obligation to the memory of Jesica, a moral 
duty in response to the tragedy that resulted from the errors. 
One might reasonably evaluate this statement as an expression of concern for the 
Santillan family and for the reputations of Duke University Hospital and its staff members. 
Additionally, Dr. Jaggers accepted responsibility for “those errors” in this public statement. Still, 
employing the reasonable person standard, it is dissatisfying as a genuine apology because he 
was vague about the wrongs committed and how it was that he should be held responsible for 
those wrongs. Without these specifics we must infer that Dr. Jaggers was remorseful, though his 
statement is more closely tied to regret. Overall, Dr. Jaggers seems to be sincere about the 
expressed attitudes of empathy, grief, and regret in his statement and seems to intend to serve the 
Santillans as best he can in the wake of the error. He gives the impression of being an ethical, 
compassionate, and mindful physician who is painfully bewildered at his own involvement in 
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such a simple, yet devastating, incidence of error. However, this public statement is not quite 
robust enough to meet our criteria for a genuine apology. Of course, it was a statement directed 
to a broader public, not to the Santillan family exclusively, so there was not a specific ethical 
imperative to apologize to that audience.148
2.5.2 Public Statement from the Hospital’s Chief Executive Officer 
Since that the transplantation error occurred at a large medical center and involved interrelated 
systems of organ procurement and transplantation, it is reasonable to expect that a Duke 
University spokesperson would contribute to the public discourse about the error. Duke’s Office 
of News and Communications posted an article online on February 22, 2003 that included a 
statement by Dr. William J. Fulkerson, the vice president and chief executive officer of Duke 
University Hospital. In the statement, Dr. Fulkerson says: 
All of us at Duke University Hospital are deeply saddened by Jesica’s passing. 
Jesica’s care team is especially saddened. We want Jesica’s family and supporters 
to know that we share their loss and their grief. We very much regret the 
heartbreaking circumstances surrounding her care.  
The original mismatch was a tragic error, and Duke accepts responsibility 
for our mistake. Every effort was made to save Jesica’s life. I give my heartfelt 
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sympathy to Jesica’s family and supporters, and I thank the entire care team who 
worked so hard to sustain her.149
Dr. Fulkerson’s role in offering a statement differed from Dr. Jaggers’s in that Dr. Fulkerson was 
not directly involved in the processes of organ matching, procurement, and transplantation in the 
Santillan case. Still, as an executive within the institution where the transplant surgery took 
place, Dr. Fulkerson was an appropriate figure to offer public comment on a case that was 
closely followed by local and national media. 
This statement, like Dr. Jaggers’s, began with an expression grief for Jesica’s death and 
sympathy for the Santillan family and their supporters. However, he offered these sentiments on 
behalf of “all of us at Duke” including, specifically, Jesica’s care team rather than for himself, 
personally. He extended this collective expression to include regret for the “heartbreaking 
circumstances surrounding her care.” Dr. Fulkerson used the pronoun ‘we’ in this portion of his 
statement, though it is unclear to whom ‘we’ referred. If it was the care team, then Dr. Fulkerson 
seemed to be including himself in that team (though he was not) and speaking for the whole 
team. Dr. Jaggers was a more appropriate figure to speak for the care team, and he explicitly took 
responsibility for that team. Dr. Fulkerson may have been speaking on behalf of the whole 
hospital, but that would be overreaching. If he purported to speak for the entire hospital, his 
statements should not be regarded as an accurate representation of how each individual member 
of the institution felt about the situation. Indeed, we can expect that there was a variety of 
emotional responses among members of the hospital staff: shock, anger, grief, resentment, 
frustration, or even relief about not having been involved in the situation. Furthermore, the 
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politicization of Jesica’s case spurred broader arguments about the ethics of medical tourism, 
immigration, and the distribution of scarce donor organs.150 A third and more appropriate 
possibility is that Dr. Fulkerson spoke as a member of the hospital who was included in a line of 
responsibility extending from Jesica’s care team through high administrative levels, though he 
was not explicit about this standpoint. While Dr. Jaggers also made general claims about how 
Duke as a whole supported his team and grieved for Jesica, he does not speak from the same 
position of authority as Dr. Fulkerson and may be given more latitude for his assertions about the 
institution. Dr. Fulkerson, however, must be careful about how he represents the institution in 
which he is the highest executive. 
In the next portion of the statement, Dr. Fulkerson called the blood type mismatch “a 
tragic error,” and said that “Duke accepts responsibility for our mistake.” It is this second claim 
that is conceptually troublesome. Even though Dr. Fulkerson, as CEO, has the standing to 
represent the institution, he cannot accept blame or responsibility on behalf of others in the 
institution. To say that ‘Duke’ made a mistake is to anthropomorphize the institution and to 
abstract from actual events to a nonspecific and inaccurate representation of what happened in a 
similar process as the “representative/collective apology” discussed in a previous section. Surely, 
more than one individual was involved with the lack of communication and miscommunication 
in the organ matching process. Additionally, specific procedures in Duke’s transplantation 
department could have been established to prevent against such communication problems. 
However, those responsible for the specific error included at least one member of the external 
organ procurement organization and possibly a representative from the United Network for 
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Organ Sharing (UNOS) in addition to members of the transplant team at Duke. Also, the 
individuals at Duke responsible for verifying organ compatibility were identifiable, not unknown 
“somebodies.” This statement of collective responsibility on the part of Duke omits specific 
acknowledgment of how the institution was responsible for “our mistake.” If the institution, in 
addition to the specific individuals identified above, was indeed partly to blame for the error, it 
would have been for the inadequacy, absence, or lack of enforcement of specific policies 
concerning the verification of patient information before beginning an intervention. 
Responsibility for these policies rests with administrators in the transplant department, as well as 
those overseeing the hospital as a whole, but responsibility ought not be abstracted to the entire 
institution.  
Dr. Fulkerson’s statement closes with similar elements to Dr. Jaggers’s statement: 
assurance that the doctors made “every effort” to save Jesica, a personal offer of sympathy to 
Jesica’s loved ones, and his appreciation to the care team for their efforts to keep Jesica alive. 
These expressions are appropriate for Dr. Fulkerson to offer, just as they were appropriate in Dr. 
Jaggers’s statement, especially because he offers them on his own behalf in this case rather than 
on behalf of Duke or the care team. 
Like Dr. Jaggers’s statement, Dr. Fulkerson’s includes an acceptance of responsibility for 
the mistake that took place but does not disclose any details of the error or specifically identify 
how Jesica was wronged. Dr. Jaggers accepted responsibility personally but his vagueness and 
lack of explicit remorse compromised the statement’s potential as an apology. Likewise, Dr. 
Fulkerson’s statement cannot meet the conceptual criteria for apology because it does not specify 
the wrongdoing and, furthermore, does not identify who is to blame. An institution as a whole 
cannot express remorse for wrongdoing committed by select individuals, nor can Dr. Fulkerson 
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express personal remorse on behalf of another or an institution. The statement does, however, 
communicate Dr. Fulkerson’s regret for the error (though he uses the pronoun ‘we’) and empathy 
for the Santillan family, expressions that the family and the public almost certainly expect to hear 
from a representative of the institution where the surgery took place. 
2.5.3 Public Statement from Duke University 
About two weeks after Jesica’s death, Duke Medicine News and Communications issued a 
retrospective statement (presumably written by Dr. Fulkerson, as it incorporates first-person 
discourse) to discusses the media portrayals of events following the botched transplant and 
Duke’s consequent interactions with the Santillan family, the media, and the United Network for 
Organ Sharing (UNOS). The statement reads, in part: 
The issues surrounding Jesica Santillan were unlike anything we’ve experienced 
as individuals or as an institution. In just a few days, her case forced Duke to 
grapple with some of the most troubling questions that face today’s hospitals and 
physicians: medical questions about mistakes in care and how to prevent them, 
ethical questions about organ transplantation and end-of-life issues, and 
communications questions about balancing a patient’s right to privacy, the needs 
of the family, and the public’s right to know. 
 We at Duke tried to find the right answers to these questions. In most 
instances, I believe we were successful, but there were also things that we wished 
we had done better. But I am certain that, every step of the way, we at Duke were 
completely honest with Jesica’s family, and I know we provided her the best 
available care under the most trying of circumstances. For any hospital or 
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physician, these are the crucial obligations, and I am confident we fulfilled our 
medical responsibilities and did all we could to save Jesica’s life. 
As much of America knows, Jesica received a heart-lung transplant at 
Duke on Feb. 7. Because of a misunderstanding between her surgeon, Dr. Jim 
Jaggers, and the organ transplant coordinating agency that provided the heart and 
lungs, Dr. Jaggers did not learn until surgery was nearly complete that the organs 
came from a donor with a different blood type than Jessica. 
Immediately after surgery, Dr. Jaggers and Duke took several key actions. 
Jesica’s family was notified immediately by Dr. Jaggers that an error had 
occurred and he explained in detail what had happened, enabling them to make 
informed decisions about her care. Duke offered all its medical resources to treat 
Jesica. We hope that what we have learned will contribute to the development of 
new national guidelines that will prevent such a mistake from happening 
anywhere.151
After addressing several specific concerns about the aftermath of the error (which I summarize 
later), the statement closes: 
None of us will ever forget the profound sense of loss with the death of Jesica, 
and none of us wants to relive an outcome such as occurred here. We are 
committed to providing our patients with the very best available medical care with 
compassion. We are committed to learning from this event, improving the system, 
and sharing that information with others. And, we are committed to earning the 
                                                 
151 Duke Medicine News and Communications, “Jesica Santillan and Duke: What We Learned,” March 11, 
2003, http://www.dukehealth.org/HealthLibrary/News/6436 (accessed October 8, 2008). 
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continued trust of our patients. Jesica’s memory compels us all to accept nothing 
less. 152
This statement pinpoints the error as a miscommunication between the transplant surgeon 
and the coordinator from Carolina Donor Services and offers evidence to support the claim that 
Duke “fulfilled [their] medical responsibilities.” This claim about fulfilling responsibilities must 
be referring to Jesica’s care after the erroneous transplant, for it would be absurd to claim that 
medical responsibilities were fulfilled despite the breach of standard practice that calls for 
verification of donor and recipient compatibility.153 This statement also provides greater detail 
than earlier public statements about the nature of the error and who was involved in its 
commission. 
The description of the actions taken by Dr. Jaggers and Duke following the surgery 
indicate that they offered prompt disclosure to Jesica’s family and offered remediation for the 
harms (“Duke offered all its medical resources to treat Jesica.”). Additionally, the statement 
expressed an interest by Duke’s administration to reform their own system and promote safety 
initiatives on a national scale. The reform-minded comments come both toward the beginning of 
the statement and in the closing paragraph, which also includes an expression of grief and regret 
for Jesica’s death. The specific details of the policy changes enacted by Duke to prevent 
recurrence of such an error—over twenty reforms between the transplant division and the 
                                                 
152 Duke Medicine News and Communications, “Jesica Santillan and Duke: What We Learned,” March 11, 
2003, http://www.dukehealth.org/HealthLibrary/News/6436 (accessed October 8, 2008). 
153 In some cases, surgeons can transplant organs of a different blood type than the recipient if the donor 
organ is predicted to deteriorate slowly enough in the course of rejection that it can provide some short-term benefit 
until a more compatible organ can be procured. In these cases, however, there must be explicit confirmation by the 
procurement and transplant teams that the blood type mismatch is acceptable. See Richard I. Cook, “Hobson’s 
Choices: Matching and Mismatching in Transplantation Work Processes,” in Wailoo, Livingston, and Guarnaccia, A 
Death Retold, 53-56. 
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administration of the Medical Center—are summarized by surgeon Thomas Diflo,154 though 
Duke’s publicity usually only mentions the new requirement of triple verification of blood type 
by key members of the transplant team.155
Sociologist Charles L. Bosk comments, “The new policies and procedures have the look 
of an instrumental set of actions, but they have the feel of expressive behavior.”156 The policies 
are presumably meant to convey concern for patient safety and commitment to maintaining the 
institution’s reputation as one of the top medical centers in the nation. Indeed, this statement 
offered on behalf of Duke may fit the description of a “value-declaring apology,” which admits 
the wrongdoing of others (and, thus, is a misnomer as an ‘apology’) and declares to uphold other 
values in the future.157 The statement asserts Duke’s commitment to providing high-quality 
patient care and setting an example for other hospitals through its policy reforms in response to 
the error. 
The rest of the statement, excluded from the excerpt above, reads like a piece of classic 
apologia: a statement in explanation and defense of the actions taken by Duke Hospital. It 
addresses the various accusations by members of the public and media about particular actions 
Duke took following the error and justifies those actions in the name of the patient’s 
confidentiality and family’s privacy, honoring the family’s wishes, following standard medical 
procedures (especially in light of Jesica’s advancement to the top of the transplant list for her 
second heart-lung transplant), infection control, and limiting distractions for the care team. 
                                                 
154 Thomas Diflo, “The Surgeon’s Perspective on the Bungled Transplant, in Wailoo, Livingston, and 
Guarnaccia, A Death Retold, 78-9. 
155 See, for example, Associated Press, “A Year Later, Efforts Are On to Avoid Another Botched 
Transplant,” New York Times, February 22, 2004, late edition, http://proquest.umi.com/; Lawrence K. Altman, 
“Even the Elite Hospitals Aren’t Immune to Errors,” New York Times, February 23, 2003, late edition, 
http://proquest.umi.com/. 
156 Charles L. Bosk, “All Things Twice, First Tragedy Then Farce: Lessons from a Transplant Error,” in 
Wailoo, Livingston, and Guarnaccia, A Death Retold, 115. 
157 Smith, I Was Wrong, 148. 
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Despite the mentions of “improving the system,” and Duke’s acceptance of responsibility 
for the mistake (according to Dr. Fulkerson’s own statement), the only specific failure of the 
system mentioned in these statements is miscommunication between Dr. Jaggers and the CDS 
coordinator, who is never named. No other individuals are identified as culpable, nor does the 
statement identify why the “system” should be improved if an individual (or set of individuals) is 
to blame. These admissions are thorny: the hospital accepted responsibility for unspecified 
systems errors that led to the tragic mistake, but also specifically named and blamed the 
transplant surgeon, Dr. Jaggers, for not verbally double-checking the donor organ’s blood type. 
Since no details are given about the preconditions for the error (e.g., no rigorously enforced 
policy for patient information verification before beginning a procedure) a reader may be left 
wondering why the institution accepted responsibility if Dr. Jaggers is to blame. An 
administrator with standing to disclose specific policy or procedural failings did not do so; 
rather, he drew attention to one individual who had already taken full blame for the error.158 This 
assigning of blame and subsequent shaming, even after the hospital admitted to systems flaws, 
did not strike many as problematic, however, because Dr. Jaggers willingly accepted the 
responsibility and blame for his actions in the transplant ordeal.159 The problem with the Duke 
statement is not that Dr. Jaggers is identified as culpable but that the statement does not extend 
its analytical eye beyond Dr. Jaggers to the administrative failings that allowed such a 
misunderstanding and error to occur in the first place. 
This statement serves as an explanation and defense of the individual and institutional 
actions taken in the wake of Jesica’s first transplant. Like the statements by Dr. Jaggers and by 
                                                 
158 This is not to say that Dr. Fulkerson is the administrator to blame for policy or enforcement failings. The 
potentially responsible persons at the departmental and hospital levels are never addressed or named in this or any 
other account I have read. 
159 Bosk, “All Things Twice,” 111, 113-14. 
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Dr. Fulkerson, this statement expresses regret for the adverse outcome that resulted from a 
procedural error. Also like the statements already analyzed, this is not an apology according to 
the conceptual criteria. The author does not take personal responsibility for any wrongs, but 
rather explains what others have done and offers a declaration of values to reaffirm the 
institution’s commitment to providing high quality patient care, learning from the event, and 
earning the trust of its patients. 
2.5.4 Reactions to the Public Statements 
Commentators evaluating these statements and the media reports of such statements show 
ambivalence about the nature of the responsibility-taking expressions as well as the implications 
of systems reform in the wake of errors such as this one. Dr. Jaggers’s acceptance of 
responsibility also granted Duke, CDS, and UNOS reprieve from blame by condensing the fault 
into his own role as the surgeon and head of the transplant team. 
The media accounts of the Santillan case revealed a tension between the public 
perception of Duke as an elite hospital with top-notch physicians that happened to be involved in 
a larger, system-wide error and the criticism of Duke as “‘image conscious’ and ‘insensitive,’ as 
‘piranhas,’ or as bureaucrats who ‘dragged their feet’ or who were most concerned with public 
relations and ‘wip[ing] the tarnish off their image.’”160 These criticisms were derived, ostensibly, 
from the perception that Duke was “not being forthcoming with the family and with the 
public,”161 an allegation specifically addressed in Duke’s retrospective statement. This chapter’s 
analysis of statements by Dr. Fulkerson on behalf of Duke indicates that there was, indeed, 
                                                 
160 Morgan and others, “America’s Angel,” 29. 
161 Morgan and others, “America’s Angel,” 29. 
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opportunity to increase the ethical value of the public disclosure by acknowledging a broader 
range of wrongdoing involved in the transplantation error and by providing the opportunity for 
the responsible individuals to offer genuine apologies for their roles in the event. 
Dr. Jaggers, the only individual to speak publicly about his responsibility for the error, 
fared much better in the public eye, though reports about the surgeon negotiated the tension 
between understanding him as well-respected and compassionate or as reckless and dangerous. 
Perhaps his early and direct admission of guilt helped earn him respect among the public, or 
perhaps it was the consistent praise of his character and skill by colleagues and even the Santillan 
family that the public found so admirable.162 Additionally, a report from a Santillan family 
spokesperson that Dr. Jaggers had “wept after telling the family that he had made that tragic 
mistake” conveyed the image of a remorseful, compassionate, and forthright surgeon, an image 
that the public can find sympathetic.163 Furthermore, media stories attributing the cause of the 
error to broader systems flaws “relieved Jaggers of personal culpability, even as at the same time 
(ironically) he freely accepted responsibility. It is unclear to what extent his initial public display 
of remorse and his overt acceptance of accountability influenced the tenor of subsequent media 
coverage, allowing writers and commentators to grant him a kind of preemptory reprieve” from 
shaming.164 By these accounts, Dr. Jaggers’s public and private conduct in response to the error 
were ethically sound and accepted by the Santillan family and the public as authentic expressions 
of remorse and sorrow. 
However, the public statements by Dr. Jaggers and Dr. Fulkerson fall short of our 
definition of genuine apologies, though Dr. Jaggers’s statement approaches it much more closely 
                                                 
162 Morgan and others, “America’s Angel,” 31-2. 
163 Morgan and others, “America’s Angel,” 32. 
164 Morgan and others, “America’s Angel,” 32. 
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than Dr. Fulkerson’s for reasons already discussed.165 Still, Duke’s statements, as well as Dr. 
Jaggers’s, serve to establish and corroborate the public record of the events by identifying where 
the errors occurred and who was responsible for their commission, though there is room for 
improvement in the quality of this disclosure. Following a root-cause analysis and other 
investigation, Duke provided more comprehensive reports to the Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations as well as to UNOS, detailing the events of the error 
(which are consistent with the account provided by Cook and summarized in the previous 
chapter) and the steps Duke took immediately and in the weeks following the error to improve 
their internal processes of transplantation and patient safety, including hiring at least three patient 
safety administrators.166 Duke contributed to the public record about the events surrounding 
Jesica Santillan’s transplantation surgeries and death by releasing these internal documents in 
addition to the public statements discussed earlier in this chapter. 
I am convinced that the staying power of the public controversy following the 
transplantation error at Duke is due in some part to public dissatisfaction over the statements 
issued by the institution, Dr. Fulkerson, and Dr. Jaggers. While many other factors were clearly 
in play, such as Jesica’s immigration status and the general concerns regarding scarce resources 
being dedicated to her second transplant, I believe that individual and institutional responses 
                                                 
165 Interestingly, Susan E. Morgan and colleagues refer to Duke’s statements specifically as an apology, but 
they also acknowledge the ambivalence about the ethical interpretation of the statements that was not resolved in the 
media coverage: “In the context of heated accusations and the extraordinary error, Duke’s apology could be read in 
different ways: was it admirable forthrightness under difficult circumstances? Or were their words read as 
superficial and unsatisfying attempts to shape future discussions about the institution’s liability?” The irresolvable 
tension about the meaning of Duke’s public statements indicates a failure of those statements to pass muster with the 
reasonable person standard of genuine apology. Morgan and others, “America’s Angel,” 30. 
166 Diflo, “The Surgeon’s Perspective,” 77-8; Duke Medicine News and Communications, “Update on 
Sentinel Event Review and CMS/JCAHO,” March 21, 2003, http://dukehealth.org/HealthLibrary/News/6454 
(accessed October 8, 2008); Duke Medicine News and Communications, “Duke Releases Letter to UNOS 
Concerning Jesica Santillan,” February 21, 2003, http://dukehealth.org/HealthLibrary/News/6419 (accessed October 
8, 2003). 
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provided to the public promoted confusion over how the error occurred and who was responsible 
because they did not combine transparent disclosure with personal expressions of remorse. 
Additionally, no administrator came forward to accept his or her portion of the responsibility for 
the error even though Dr. Fulkerson identified Duke’s system as faulty. These gaps in the 
processes of disclosure and apology left room for doubt about the practical and ethical resolution 
of the wrongdoing at Duke. Following the error, Dr. Jaggers remained at Duke and many 
institutional reforms were enacted, but those responsible for overseeing the policies and practices 
are never mentioned as having neglected their duties or having failed to prevent wrongdoing. 
Instead, the institutional statements clouded over any specific enumeration of administrative 
responsibility for policy failings in favor of the vague mention that “Duke accepts responsibility 
for our mistake”167 and the specific claims about Dr. Jaggers’s failure. In the next chapter, I will 
lay out in greater detail my proposal for the promotion of a culture of responsibility within 
healthcare institutions and imagine how responses to the Jesica Santillan case might have been 
different if there were such a culture at Duke. 
 
 
In this chapter I have conceptualized apology according to its requisite components, 
goals, measures of assessment, and the exigencies that call for apology. Additionally, I have 
discussed behaviors that are related to apology and which may supplement or substitute for 
apology in some cases. I have argued that “institutional apologies”—offered by an institutional 
representative on behalf of another institutional member or the institution as a whole—are 
                                                 
167 Duke University Office of News and Communications, “Duke Continues Review of Jesica Santillan 
Case,” February 22, 2003, http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/2003/02/santillancase0203.html (accessed October 8, 
2008). 
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ethically meaningless due to the apologizer’s lack of standing to apologize and the absence of 
personal remorse and responsibility for the wrongdoing. Instead, I claim that apologies by 
institutional members may only be offered by individuals for their own institutional role-related 
wrongdoing. This claim will be further developed in the next chapter, where I introduce the 
concept of a “culture of responsibility-taking” and advocate such a culture for health care 
institutions. As a transition from interpersonal apologies to a culture of responsibility, let me 
offer a quotation from Nicholas Tavuchis on the scope and power of apology: 
“A consummate apology, no matter how personal or private an act, is rarely the 
sole concern of the principals. It is not easily contained because it inevitably 
touches upon the lives and convictions of interested others while raising both 
practical and moral questions that transcend the particular situation that prompted 
it. In this sense, it is quintessentially social, that is, a relational symbolic gesture 
occurring in a complex interpersonal field, with enormous reverberatory potential 
that encapsulates, recapitulates, and pays homage to a moral order rendered 
problematic by the very act that calls it forth.”168
                                                 
168 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 14. 
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3.0  TOWARD A CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
In the first two chapters, I have explored the topographies of medical error and apology, arguing 
that apology is an ethically appropriate response to instances of medical error that result in harm. 
What remains to be addressed in this final chapter is a closer examination of how apology can be 
offered in response to instances of medical error and the benefits of developing a “culture of 
responsibility” to which apology may contribute in medical institutions. My concluding remarks 
look both back to the claims of this thesis and ahead to the implications of this argument and the 
possibilities for ethical considerations of apology in future research.  
First, though, I return to the Jesica Santillan case to imagine how a different institutional 
culture at Duke may have resulted in different responses to the errors made in Jesica’s care. 
While my recommendations in this thesis have little, if any, direct bearing on the faulty policies 
and practices that led to Jesica Santillan’s harmful transplantation surgery, they do hold 
significance for the communicative and behavioral responses to the error. The following section 
proposes an imaginative reconstruction of the events following the revelation to Dr. Jaggers that 
the organs he had just transplanted into Jesica were blood type A and not compatible with 
Jesica’s blood type O. This hypothetical version of the events at Duke University Hospital allows 
us to consider how the individuals involved might have responded if their institution subscribed 
to and endorsed a culture of responsibility-taking. The following imagined events take place over 
the course of several days with attention to timeliness rather than haste. While the initial 
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disclosure of error is made to the family as soon as possible after surgery, other follow-up 
discussions and activities occur in the days and weeks following the transplantation error. 
3.1 IMAGINING A CULTURE OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE SANTILLAN CASE  
 In this reconstruction, immediately after learning about the donor organs’ blood type 
from the lab technician, Dr. Jaggers alerts the rest of the team in the operating room to the 
incompatibility of the organs transplanted into Jesica and calls an error response officer to alert 
her to the error. The transplant team applies best-known medical practices to forestall the 
inevitable rejection of the organs. As soon as surgery is complete, Dr. Jaggers and the error 
response administrator (joined by a translator) approach Jesica’s parents to disclose the error. Dr. 
Jaggers speaks: “We’ve completed the surgery and Jesica is currently in critical condition in the 
intensive care unit, but there has been a terrible error. While finishing the surgery, I learned from 
the hospital’s laboratory that the heart and lung we transplanted into Jesica were from a child 
with a different blood type than Jesica. I did not know this when I accepted the organs from the 
donor or even when I began the surgery to remove Jesica’s own heart and lungs. We need to 
investigate how this error was allowed to happen, but, as Jesica’s surgeon, it was my 
responsibility to check and double-check that the organs I transplanted were right for Jesica. I 
failed to do that—I just assumed they were correct—and I am so terribly sorry. 
“So what does this mean for Jesica? I expect that within hours, Jesica’s body will begin 
to reject the new organs, and she will eventually go into heart failure and maybe even a coma. 
We are already doing everything we can to keep these organs working for Jesica as long as 
possible, but they will not keep working for more than a number of days. I am so sorry that I 
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wasn’t careful enough while doing my job. [Here, Dr. Jaggers briefly explains the treatment 
options, including another transplantation with properly matched organs if they are available in 
time.] The hospital will make sure that Jesica’s medical needs are taken care of at no cost, either 
here at Duke or at another hospital if you choose. I want you to know that we will answer all of 
your questions as completely as we can, and we will keep you updated with any information we 
learn about this error and how it affects your family.  Ms. Smith, the error response officer, will 
come to talk with you about what Duke can do for you.”  
In having this conversation, Dr. Jaggers sits down with Jesica’s parents, looking them in 
the eyes when he speaks. He is visibly upset about the bad news he had to share with them. He 
stays with them to answer medical questions they have about Jesica’s prognosis and waits to 
leave the room until they have asked all they could at the time. As he leaves, he tells them, 
“Please feel free to call me at any time to ask questions or talk to me about your concerns—I 
mean that.” 
Jesica’s family decides to keep her at Duke with the same care team because her 
condition is so fragile and because, up to the transplantation, Jesica had received excellent 
treatment at that hospital. Still, they are in shock that such an error could have happened at such 
a highly respected institution. They are confused, sad, and frightened for Jesica’s future. 
Later, Duke’s error response officer visits the Santillan family to leave her contact 
information and a note indicating that the family should contact her when they are ready to talk 
about the hospital’s extra-clinical response to this error. The officer indicates that she is available 
to answer the family’s questions about how Duke intends to help the family with Jesica’s 
medical expenses and her parents’ living expenses due to the extra care Jesica requires as a 
consequence of the transplantation error. The officer also tells the family that they may consult a 
  95
lawyer about their legal options. When the family meets with the error response officer a few 
days later, she is forthright with the family but tells them that there is much more information to 
be learned about how the error happened. The officer promises to tell the family everything that 
the hospital learns about the error. In all subsequent conversations and negotiations with the 
family regarding financial compensation, the error response officer and other institutional 
members foster a spirit of cooperation rather than taking an adversarial approach toward the 
family.169 The hospital’s representatives understand that protracted disputes and haggling over 
compensation are contrary to a culture of and responsibility and serve to undermine the 
psychological and social benefits of apology. The error response officer considers it part of her 
job to resolve issues of medical error with as little additional pain and anger possible for all those 
involved.  
Even before the transplantation error, Jesica’s story about immigration and the search for 
life-saving medical treatment had been reported in the local media.170 However, when the media 
learn of the error—possibly through the Santillan family’s patron and advocate, Mack 
Mahoney—Dr. Jaggers and various hospital administrators are barraged by reporters’ phone calls 
                                                 
169 Within a culture of responsibility, the offer of compensation by the hospital is voluntary and takes place 
through a cooperative arbitration in which the interests and needs of the patient (or her family, in the case of death) 
are heard by an objective arbitrator. Compensation might be assessed according to a standardized schedule for death 
and disability (similar to a worker’s compensation system) with some flexibility to accommodate the particular 
circumstances of the patient and her affected family members. In any case, the determination and provision of 
compensation following medical error is not undertaken as a means of “buying off” the patient and her family but as 
a means of making fair restitution for injuries suffered as a result of preventable medical error. Nancy Berlinger 
discusses three different models of fair compensation and no-fault compensation programs already established in the 
United States. Some models offer fair compensation to injured patients (and encourage the patient to have legal 
representation during the settlement) if the patients waive their right to sue the hospital at a later date. Other models 
do not require such a waiver but also do not allow the patients to have a lawyer participate in the compensation 
determination. See Nancy Berlinger, After Harm: Medical Error and the Ethics of Forgiveness (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2005): 69-80. 
170 Susan E. Morgan and others, “America’s Angel or Thieving Immigrant?: Media Coverage, the Santillan 
Story, and Publicized Ambivalence toward Donation and Transplantation,” in A Death Retold: Jesica Santillan, the 
Bungled Transplant, and Paradoxes of Medical Citizenship, ed. Keith Wailoo, Julie Livingston, and Peter 
Guarnaccia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 27-8. 
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seeking more information, including personal confessions and any consequences for the 
responsible person(s). In response to the media fervor and with permission of the Santillan 
family, Dr. Jaggers171 issues his public statement: “Jesica Santillan underwent a heart-lung 
transplant at Duke Hospital to treat her life-threatening illness. Unfortunately, there was a 
terrible error: I inadvertently transplanted organs that were an incompatible blood type for Jesica, 
and the organ rejection she is experiencing has made her critically ill. As Jesica’s surgeon, it was 
my responsibility to verify and re-verify that the organs were appropriate for Jesica; I failed to do 
this. The doctors and nurses who are caring for Jesica are tremendously talented and are doing 
everything they can for her. I grieve with her family and with members of the medical team for 
the trauma Jesica has suffered. Please keep them all in your thoughts and prayers.” 
Dr. Fulkerson, the chief executive officer and vice president of Duke University Hospital, 
also issues a statement with the Santillan family’s permission: “We at Duke are deeply saddened 
and troubled by the transplant error that occurred on February 7. We continue to investigate how 
such an error happened and we are cooperating fully with the relevant agencies, such as the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations and the Health Department, which 
assess hospital quality. It is evident that individuals besides Dr. Jaggers contributed to the 
ultimate error of transplanting incompatible organs into Jesica Santillan. This error was the result 
of major and minor failings throughout Duke and the organ sharing network. As far as Duke is 
concerned, we did not have adequate policies and practices in place to assure double-checking all 
key information before beginning this medical procedure. These policies and practices are an 
                                                 
171 Most medical errors are not publicly announced nor garner such intense attention from the media as the 
Duke transplantation error, so we would typically expect the physician to be focused on patient care rather than 
public relations concerns. However, Dr. Jaggers was a key figure in this highly publicized case of a celebrated 
surgeon’s terrible mistake. Additionally, he had been involved with Jesica’s medical care for at least the year that 
she was on the waiting list for a heart-lung transplant at Duke. It is reasonable to expect that Dr. Jaggers—with the 
Santillan family’s permission—would offer a public statement in this case, given the combination of intense media 
attention and Dr. Jaggers’s extended involvement with Jesica’s care. 
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administrative responsibility, and we will address them as such. As an executive of this hospital, 
I’m sorry that I failed to recognize and address the dangerous flaws in our transplant procedures.  
Dr. Jaggers is a well-respected and important member of our institution, and we will be working 
with him and all members of the transplant department to assess, discuss, and possibly alter the 
protocols for various procedures in that department. Please be assured that Duke will do 
everything possible to correct our institutional failings and to assure the safest patient care 
possible. It is my responsibility to oversee these investigations and improvements and you have 
my word that they will be done thoroughly. Meanwhile, I am keeping Jessica and her family in 
my prayers and hoping for the best possible resolution to this tragic situation.” 
In the days following the transplantation surgery, Jesica’s condition continues to 
deteriorate, and Jesica’s family and the surgical team eagerly hope for a new heart and lungs to 
allow for a second transplant. Whether or not new organs become available or whether Jesica 
will even be healthy enough for a repeat transplant, the doctors in charge of Jesica’s care keep 
her family up-to-date with all the developments of her care and include them in decisions about 
possible treatment or end-of-life care. The Santillan family is also invited to participate in patient 
safety discussions regarding prevention of medical errors such as the ones that affected their 
daughter. Ultimately, the Santillan family decides not to pursue a malpractice case against Duke 
or Dr. Jaggers. Throughout Jesica’s post-transplantation time at Duke, her medical care is 
provided at no cost to her family. Following Jesica’s death, resulting from organ rejection of the 
blood type A heart and lungs, Duke settled with the Santillan family to provide fair 
compensation for the fatal medical error. These financial provisions, the full disclosure of all 
information related to the transplantation error and the hospital’s remediation efforts, and the 
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personal and heartfelt apologies from Dr. Jaggers, Dr. Fulkerson, and the CDS coordinator172, 
assured the Santillan family that nothing else could be done to make the tragic situation any 
better for future patients at the hospital, the Santillan family, or their daughter. 
3.2 ON APOLOGIES AND TAKING RESPONSIBILITY 
In this chapter, I have referred to a “culture of responsibility.” This concept deserves 
explanation, particularly as it relates to the conclusions in the first two chapters of this thesis and 
the hypothetical case example above. The definition of apology I have developed requires that an 
offender 1) acknowledge that a wrong was committed; 2) accept responsibility for her 
contribution to that wrong; 3) express remorse; and 4) intend to benefit the victim through the 
offer of the apology. We understand that apology requires explicitly taking responsibility for 
one’s wrongdoing, but the converse is not true: Taking responsibility for one’s actions does not 
necessitate an associated apology, whether or not a justification is offered for those actions. Still, 
it is ethically troubling to admit fault for an error that has harmed another person (in the absence 
of justification) without also expressing remorse and, thus, apology for the harmful error. 
Therefore, my argument for a culture of responsibility considers responsibility to be both 
retrospective and prospective. One may take responsibility retrospectively by recognizing and 
acknowledging her effect on those around her when she has erred in some way. This approach 
recognizes human fallibility and attempts to maintain civil relations by affording a means of 
                                                 
172 Due to the CDS coordinator’s culpable role in the organ mismatch, he has the standing and ethical 
obligation to apologize. However, the coordinator is not within the jurisdiction of Duke’s system and is subject to 
his own institutional culture and responsibilities. His apology is not included in this fictitious reconstruction of 
events in order to keep the focus on Duke’s imagined institutional culture of responsibility. 
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assuming responsibility and expressing associated emotions while avoiding the negative effects 
of finger-pointing behaviors that merely blame and shame.173 Taking responsibility prospectively 
in a culture of responsibility incorporates goal-setting, moral reasoning and deliberation, and the 
role-based obligations that adhere to members of institutions.174 Looking forward with a sense of 
responsibility helps to anticipate and prevent harmful error from occurring. After an error, taking 
responsibility should occur in both directions: retrospectively by recognizing and admitting one’s 
role in an error and prospectively by fulfilling one’s role-based obligations to attend to the 
consequent needs of the victim. The offender may also need to deliberate with other members of 
the institution to set goals for preventing similar occurrences in the future. In such a culture, the 
practice of genuine apology is not a rarity but, rather, proceeds naturally from retrospective 
responsibility-taking. 
When one takes responsibility and genuinely apologizes to the victim of one’s 
wrongdoing, the encounter can have significant positive effects on the apologizer, the victim, and 
their community or social context.175 To that end, sociologist Nicholas Tavuchis writes, “An 
apology thus speaks to an act that cannot be undone but that cannot go unnoticed without 
compromising the current and future relationship of the parties, the legitimacy of the violated 
                                                 
173 The distinction between guilt and shame is important here. Guilt is “the capacity to apply standards of 
right and wrong to our behavior toward others” and is an acknowledgement of culpability for a specific instance of 
wrongdoing. Shame is “an emotional reaction to the experience of failing to live up one’s image of oneself” and 
“appears to be a response to a more general judgment about the self,” often resulting in a desire to avoid one’s 
victims rather than to make amends. Appropriate feelings of guilt are healthy for the individual and are socially 
beneficial, whereas the perpetuation of shame can be emotionally and socially damaging. Aaron Lazare, On Apology 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004): 135-6. 
174 Virginia A. Sharpe, “Taking Responsibility for Medical Mistakes,” in Margin of Error: The Ethics of 
Mistakes in the Practice of Medicine, ed. Susan B. Rubin and Laurie Zoloth (Hagerstown, MD: University 
Publishing Group, 2000), 185-6. 
175 Nick Smith, I Was Wrong: The Meanings of Apologies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
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rule, and the wider social web in which the participants are enmeshed.”176 For the victim, 
receiving an apology signals that her offender recognized the wrong as a wrong and is an 
occasion when the victim is treated as a moral equal with (and by) her offender. The victim, if 
convinced of the offender’s true remorse, can have renewed confidence in the shared values that 
operate within their relational context. The epistemic benefits  (transparency, knowledge, 
resolved confusion, sharing information) of open disclosure also accrue to the recipient of a 
genuine apology. 
For the offender, an apology may be an important step in processing the shock and pain 
from realizing she has harmed another person. Bioethicist Nancy Berlinger puts it this way: 
“Saying ‘I’m sorry’ – and meaning it, and accepting the full consequences of these words – is a 
time-honored way to expiate paralyzing feelings of guilt or shame that a psychologically healthy 
person feels after having unintentionally harmed another person.”177 Ethical apology is not a 
quick fix to eliminate feelings of guilt, but it may be restorative for both offender and offended. 
Still, when authentically engaged, apology can be a very uncomfortable experience for the 
offender, who is exposing herself to scrutiny, criticism, and censure by reminding herself (and, 
perhaps, others) of the wrong she committed. While some of this discomfort might be avoided by 
offering a written apology in lieu of a face-to-face conversation, “there is, quite simply, nothing 
as effective and unsettling as having to address in person someone we have wronged, no matter 
how much a culture stresses writing, print, or electronic communication to the detriment of 
speech.”178 Being unsettled by the realization and direct admission of one’s wrongdoing is a 
                                                 
176 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1991): 13. 
177 Nancy Berlinger, After Harm: Medical Error and the Ethics of Forgiveness (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2005), 96. 
178 Tavuchis, Mea Culpa, 23. 
  101
natural—and perhaps necessary—element of restoring moral order between offender and victim. 
Indeed, if an offender is not somewhat uncomfortable facing her victim to offer an apology, we 
might wonder whether the offender is uncomfortable with wrongdoing in general. 
The social context within which an offense occurs can also be strained as a result of the 
infraction. A genuine apology offered from offender to victim reaffirms the expected norms in 
that context and reminds witnesses of those expectations and consequences.179 If the norms of 
memberships in various communities (professional or familial, for example) are acknowledged 
and validated by our fellow members, then our compliance with communal expectations are a 
sign of our moral commitment to the membership and its stability.180 The community bond is 
strengthened when an offender is reminded of how she has jeopardized her membership by 
violating the trust of the others, and “it is only by personally acknowledging ultimate 
responsibility, expressing genuine sorrow and regret, and pledging henceforth (implicitly or 
explicitly) to abide by the rules, that the offender simultaneously recalls and is re-called to that 
which binds.”181
The material benefits of apology are worth noting, as well. Berlinger argues that offering 
an apology and compensation to injured patients reduces the perceived need to sue the offender 
“because these words and actions, offered together, satisfy each of the needs—to know what 
                                                 
179 Offering an apology, like following rules of etiquette, signals the performer’s familiarity and compliance 
with social and moral norms. Moreover, apologies and manners demonstrate consideration and respect for others as 
moral equals and preserve (or restore) harmonious social relations. The ethical import of apology is not just in the 
acceptance of responsibility and remorse for wrongdoing, but also in the explicit, expressed apology statement that 
serves as an outward display of morality, much like the display of manners is taken to be a sign of one’s moral and 
ethical consideration for others. This argument for the moral significance of manners is made by Sarah Buss: “If, as 
seems obvious, the essential point of these [etiquette] rules is to instruct people on how to treat each other 
respectfully, and if, as I have argued, treating people respectfully is essential to treating them with respect, then the 
essential point of good manners is a moral point: to enable us to treat one another with respect.” See Sarah Buss, 
“Appearing Respectful: The Moral Significance of Manners,” Ethics 109 (July 1999): 795-826. 
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happened, to have one’s suffering taken seriously, to repair, literally and symbolically, the 
damage caused by the mistake—that along with anger at nondisclosure, lack of apology, and lack 
of compensation, drive lawsuits.”182 Aaron Lazare also acknowledges this relationship between 
malpractice suits and apology, noting that the patient is less likely to sue if she believes that her 
“views, values, and perspectives have been respected” by her doctor.183 Recent studies have 
shown that when a clinician honestly discloses errors to her patients and offers a timely apology 
her patients are less likely to sue and, if they do sue, tend to settle for smaller settlements 
resulting in decreased legal fees and malpractice premiums.184
Apologies affect those who offer, receive, and witness them, so it is appropriate to 
understand a culture of responsibility as being concerned with the reception of and possible 
follow-on activities to apology in addition to the specific offers of apology themselves. The 
hierarchical and peer relationships within institutions bear on the initiation and maintenance of a 
culture of responsibility; the next section describes how administrators and clinicians (and 
superiors and subordinates, generally) have responsibilities within this culture. Additionally, the 
next section will discuss the new norms for these institutionally structured relationships in the 
culture of responsibility, including how responsibility-taking and apology-giving acknowledge, 
restore, and maintain the working relationships among administrators, clinicians, patients, and 
families. 
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3.3 APOLOGIES IN HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS 
As described in this thesis, the social practice of apology has psychological benefits to the dyad 
of giver and receiver as well as social benefits to the communities in which it is practiced. A 
culture of responsibility-taking, complete with the promotion of genuine apology, within health 
care institutions can also contribute to the broader goals of safe and effective patient care. We 
would hope that in all health care institutions, both administrators and clinicians are concerned 
with the provision of high quality care while looking for ways to improve patient care and safety 
at every level. Taking responsibility for errors is a necessary first step to improving the quality of 
care because, “rhetorically, it can be difficult to deny responsibility for an offensive act and then 
announce corrective action. After all, if one is not responsible for an offense, then what is there 
to correct?”185 An institution with a culture of responsibility would strive to foster and maintain 
an animating atmosphere of collective responsibility for the well-being of others.  
Ideally, health care institutions would promote a culture of safety and high quality care 
that would encourage individuals at every level of care and service to feel a sense of 
responsibility for others with regard to promoting safety and preventing error. Embrace of this 
culture of safety could not be a strict legal obligation; rather, it would be an attitude and an 
approach inculcated and supported by reasonable policies and the examples set by senior 
members of the institution. This culture resembles the theory of continuous quality improvement 
(CQI) described by Sharpe and Faden, which “depends in large part on the willingness of 
leadership in health care institutions and organizations to abandon the practice of finger-pointing 
in favor of supportive and cooperative goal-setting. In such a context, the incentive system will 
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be oriented to rewards for cooperation rather than penalties for non-compliance.”186 
Additionally, subscribing to a culture of responsibility means that all institutional members will 
come together to learn from each other when errors occur rather than seek to shun and shame the 
one who has committed the error.187
When errors inevitably occur, however rarely, the responsible parties in an institution 
with a culture of responsibility would transparently and compassionately disclose the error to the 
patient (or appropriate representatives) and work with other members of the institution to provide 
the affected patient with clear and complete information about her injury and the measures taken 
to restore her to wholeness.188 In addition to disclosure, the responsible parties would also be 
able and encouraged to offer a genuine apology to the victim without fear of condemnation by 
peers or administrators for the admission of fault. Within health care institutions, a culture of 
responsibility would not condone browbeating members into submission to an apology policy 
                                                 
186 Virginia A. Sharpe and Alan I. Faden, Medical Harm: Historical, Conceptual, and Ethical Dimensions 
of Iatrogenic Illness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 144. 
187 One example of institutional members coming together to learn from error may be the surgical Mortality 
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the future.” [“All Things Twice, First Tragedy then Farce: Lessons from a Transplant Error” in Wailoo, Livingston, 
and Guarnaccia, A Death Retold, 115.] However, these conferences serve a limited purpose and should not be used 
as a general model for error response and quality improvement. First, attendance at these private conferences is 
limited to the surgical housestaff and attending physicians and does not include other care teams, patients, their 
families, or all relevant hospital administrators. Also, the “M&M” conference limits the scope of peer review to the 
actions taken by the surgical team and tends to rely on formal, technical explanations for adverse events rather than 
normative and quasi-normative errors. These explanations reinforce perfection as a goal but acknowledge that bad 
outcomes happen even without the commission of error. At these reviews, the attending surgeon takes ultimate 
responsibility for good and bad outcomes, regardless of the specific actions of his or her subordinates who are 
protected from public shame in the surgical training culture. “M&M” conferences may be included within a culture 
of responsibility, but they cannot serve as a substitute for the transparent and cooperative clinical and administrative 
practices I advocate as part of a broader, ethical institutional culture. 
188 Disclosure and apology need not be offered by the same person, though genuine apology may only be 
offered by the one(s) responsible for the wrongdoing. Health care institutions may have personnel who are better 
positioned to provide timely and accurate information to patients than the primary caregiver, for example. 
Disclosure may be an ongoing process as new information emerges. Also, apology may occur in a separate 
discussion from the disclosure, although genuine apology cannot precede disclosure of the wrongdoing and harm. 
An offender may apologize more than once, especially if she learns that she has more to apologize for than she 
included in her initial apology. In any case, the institution is responsible to assure that the victims of error receive 
full disclosure of the error and information about how it will affect them. 
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that fails to consider the ethical dimensions of such an encounter. Since apology includes an 
expression of the offender’s genuine remorse, it must arise from appropriate humility and an 
assumption of responsibility or feeling of guilt rather than from policy-driven shaming by others. 
A culture of responsibility seeks to develop in institutional members a greater regard for the 
ethical treatment of patients than their own desire to avoid or deny the situation by concealing, 
minimizing, or manipulating information and interactions with the patient and her family. Such a 
culture recognizes and seeks to develop in members an appropriate perspective on human 
fallibility and an understanding of the need both to reduce error-prone practice and to recognize 
when they owe an apology to others. 
In light of these ethical goals of an institution with a culture of responsibility, the charge 
for institutions is threefold. First, institutions must teach the value of apology to their members. 
This value extends beyond providing the offender’s sense of personal closure or expiation to 
include addressing the patient’s need for acknowledgement, empathy, and psychological safety. 
Second, institutions must foster a culture of responsibility through policies designed to facilitate 
and not impede apologies between those responsible for error and those who have been affected 
by error. Ongoing training and institutional support for forthright and ethical communication 
between institutional members and patients can contribute to the ethical culture of the institution, 
as will the institution’s fulfilled promise to those it serves that its members will disclose error, 
apologize for wrongdoing, discuss measures taken to prevent recurrence of wrongdoing, and 
compensate for harm caused by error. Third, institutions must support the clinicians and 
administrators, as well as the victims of error and their families, throughout the whole ordeal. 
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Chaplains,189 counselors, or others who can offer psychological support may be made available 
to both the offender and victim if requested. Patients should expect to be able to ask questions 
and receive clear answers, and the offenders should be able to count on access to the advice and 
training necessary to uphold their ethical duties to speak openly and ethically with their victims. 
If a victim does not wish to see or speak with the person who committed the harmful error, that 
wish should be honored and the institution should provide a patient advocate to act as a liaison to 
facilitate the flow of information to and from the victim (though this advocate cannot apologize 
on behalf of others but could convey an apology from the offender if the victim were amenable 
to that arrangement). Furthermore, the institution should not try to help the offenders ignore the 
personal ramifications of error or “brush it off.” Rather, providing emotional support to help 
offenders recognize and deal with their guilt in a healthy and productive way can avoid the 
dangers to current and future patients that may result when an offender rationalizes her actions, 
views herself as infallible, or is debilitated by shame and fear of ever making another mistake.190
Another charge for the institution adhering to a culture of responsibility is to assure that 
subordinates do not take an undue measure of blame for error that is more appropriately shared 
with those in higher authority.191 In a hierarchical system, it may be easy for those higher up the 
ladder to pass on blame to their subordinates, but a culture of responsibility requires that 
attention be given at every level to the quality of care and service offered and to institute changes 
in policy and practice as necessary to provide safe and high quality care, regardless of who may 
have initially drawn attention to the need for change. 
                                                 
189 Although some people rely on religious understandings of human fallibility to make sense of error, I 
suggest the possible involvement of chaplains for two practical reasons. First, most hospitals already have chaplains 
available on staff and, so, would not need to hire additional staff. Second, both wrongdoers and victims may request 
that someone pray with them, regardless of their own views about the spirituality (or not) of human fallibility. 
190 Berlinger, After Harm, 106-7. 
191 Berlinger, After Harm, 101. 
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This last consideration raises the issue of whether medical errors are caused by 
individuals, systems, or both. As sociologist Charles L. Bosk claims, “One can build a case that 
all medical errors are systems errors. One can also build a case that all errors are the result of 
individuals making misjudgments. The choice between the terms ‘systems error’ and ‘individual 
misjudgment’ is as much political as it is empirical. Either term contains a metaphor about how 
the world is broken and how it is best fixed.”192 It is also a false choice, because errors in 
institutional systems naturally involve the actions of fallible individuals who act within those 
flawed systems. Attributing error to individual deficiencies may be counterproductive to a 
culture of responsibility because it “naturally engenders an atmosphere of defensiveness (such as 
the tendency to offer excuses) and evasiveness.”193 At the same time, however, failing to identify 
any responsible individuals is also likely to stunt the development of a culture of responsibility 
by indicating that individuals are not expected to take personal responsibility for their own 
actions and reform. An institution that recognizes individual contribution to error yet engages in 
structural reform to improve care system-wide may avoid the ethical and functional pitfalls of an 
institution that focuses exclusively on either scapegoating individuals or blaming vague “systems 
errors.”194
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3.3.1 Apologies by Clinicians 
The challenges clinicians face in embracing a culture of responsibility begin early in their 
careers. During medical195 training, future and newly minted doctors must manage the tensions 
of the “hidden curriculum,” which insidiously teaches them to deviate from the explicit 
“professional obligation to tell patients the truth about their health—and to learn, by observing 
their senior colleagues, how to avoid doing this very thing.”196 Moreover, the drive to 
demonstrate professional competence and flawlessness opposes the demands and permissions of 
a culture of responsibility, which allows and indeed requires clinicians to recognize human 
fallibility and the inevitability of error. Troublingly, clinicians may avoid taking appropriate 
responsibility by obscuring facts and culpability through rhetorical tactics such as specialized 
jargon (“It’s a simple bowel perforation.”), euphemisms (“an unfortunate complication”), and 
passive construction (“A pneumothorax occurred.”).197 These behaviors violate a clinician’s 
professional and ethical obligations to be clear and truthful with their patients and colleagues 
about the nature and known causes of the patient’s condition. Furthermore, deception and 
defensiveness work against the ultimate goals of patient safety and effective patient care by 
diminishing opportunities for the culpable clinician, her peers, and hospital administrators to 
learn about dangerous practices or faulty policies that contribute to medical error and patient 
injury. 
According to the definition of apology used in this thesis, we understand that clinicians’ 
responsibility to apologize must be limited to those medical errors to which their own actions or 
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inactions contributed substantially and which resulted in patient harm (regardless of the patients’ 
knowledge of the harm). An apology is in order when a clinician has failed to meet her ethical 
and professional obligations of due care. A pamphlet about disclosing adverse events published 
by the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management admits that the circumstances 
warranting an apology are sometimes difficult for a clinician to determine: 
“Do we know if we have betrayed patient trust? Do we know if we have 
contributed to unmet expectations? For physicians who can tune into their own 
feelings, this is easier to determine. However, when fear of reprisal, belief that 
there is no responsibility or lack of empathy for the effect on the patient/family 
intervenes, then knowing that an apology is in order becomes a challenge.”198  
A genuine apology from a clinician achieves more than simply fulfilling a duty to disclose to 
patients and filing a report to administrators. Authentic remorse for the wrong contributes to a 
demonstration of empathy, which draws the apology’s focus to the victim’s suffering in addition 
to other concerns such as “the violated principle, the offender’s failures, or the process of the 
offender’s redemption.”199
3.3.2 Apologies by Administrators 
In the literature on apologies in medical contexts, the focus has been on doctors apologizing to 
their patients for harming them through error or negligence. However, I argue that hospital 
administrators also have a professional and ethical obligation to apologize to those harmed by 
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faulty policies or procedures (or failures to enforce appropriate ones) that are within the 
responsibility of those administrators. The systems perspective on the commission and 
prevention of errors enlarges the scope of scrutiny beyond the individuals at the nexus of patient-
clinician interaction in care delivery to include other individuals involved in processes, including 
those who write, review, and enforce policies at the departmental and institutional levels. 
Berlinger correctly argues that when we talk about “systems errors,” we also ought to be thinking 
about the individuals with moral agency within that system who have responsibility for those 
errors: “‘The system’ may provide the context for a medical mistake, but does not, in and of 
itself, provide an adequate explanation for a mistake.”200 Faulty policies, practices, or traditions 
may be traceable to particular administrators who have or share responsibility for those policies 
or have the power to reform institutional rules and practices through policy change.201 Also, the 
failure to institute or enforce policy may be a culpable institutional-level or administrative error. 
Attention to individuals’ roles in or contributions to errors need not result in a return to 
castigating culpable individuals as “bad apples” and removing them from the system; instead, 
identifying all those who share in the responsibility for error can more effectively lead to 
resolution of the past error and systems improvement to prevent future errors. 
It may also be that the administration has wronged patients or the public through broader 
failings for which particular administrators may be held responsible.202 For example, if there is a 
pattern of wrongdoing by members of the institution, the leadership may be held accountable for 
failing to address the repeated wrongdoing. Additionally, administrators may be guilty of 
ignoring or concealing evidence of wrongdoing by subordinates in the institution, thereby 
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compounding the initial wrongs. These and other administrative failings warrant public 
disclosure, apology from responsible persons, and possibly remediation. 
Representatives of the institution who are not responsible for wrongdoing can also be 
involved in the processes of disclosure and compensation that may accompany apology. The 
process of disclosure is essential to genuine apology, but it may be provided by someone other 
than the person who committed the wrong. In fact, thorough and accurate information may be 
more accessible to someone other than the person (e.g., clinician) who committed the error or 
wrongdoing. If the wrongdoer refuses to communicate with her victim, or if the victim prefers 
not to speak with her offender, the administration needs to provide a liaison to provide disclosure 
and keep in touch with the patient and her family about the effects of the wrong on her health. If 
a health care institution subscribes to a program of fair compensation for medical error, much 
like the institutions described in Berlinger’s book, other administrators and institutional 
representatives will be responsible to discuss with error victims the compensation the institution 
is prepared to offer for their injuries or loss. The individual(s) responsible for the error may not 
be responsible (or able) to promise or provide compensation for harm, but their genuine apology 
to their victims is an important element in the larger program of an institution’s ethical response 
to medical error. 
3.4 CULTIVATION OF RESPONSIBILITY-TAKING 
The establishment of a culture of responsibility as described above is undoubtedly a long-
term effort that requires the participation of every level of institutional hierarchy. In the case of 
medical error and the hegemony of malpractice and risk management discourses, establishing a 
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culture of responsibility requires instituting robust policies and the unflagging support of senior 
administrators. The top-down model gives appropriate confidence to those clinicians who are 
already inclined to apologize to their patients following an error that they will not suffer 
sanctions or shaming by the administration for admitting fault for errors. Additionally, a culture 
of responsibility that begins with administrative action makes a stronger public statement, for 
which the institution may more readily be held accountable. Current and future employees of the 
hospital will have a clearer picture of the ethical attitudes and practices of that institution. 
Beyond simply establishing policy, administrators must also demonstrate support for a culture of 
responsibility by readily admitting responsibility for their own failures to fulfill their professional 
and ethical obligations and apologizing to those harmed as a result. Administrative apologies 
may be particularly meaningful to injured patients who expect the traditional defensive stance of 
risk management lawyers, but these apologies also serve as an example to subordinates and 
clinicians throughout the institution. 
Clinicians are on the “front lines” of a culture of responsibility. They are the first to learn 
about adverse events and medical errors and have the most direct interactions with their patients. 
Their apologies to patients affected by their errors contribute fundamentally to the institutional 
ecology. However, clinicians may feel they have the most to lose from exposing their 
wrongdoing to patients and thereby exposing themselves to legal liability. For this reason, a 
culture of responsibility must be supported by institutional policies and procedures that meet the 
psychological, epistemological, physical, and financial needs of those injured by medical error in 
order to decrease patients’ needs for resolution through costly litigation.  
A culture of responsibility is cultivated and maintained through the interdependence of 
administrative and clinical roles and responsibilities. Moreover, the individual actions of 
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administrators and clinicians—paradoxically—configure and are constrained by the institutional 
culture in which they take place. For a culture of responsibility to develop and thrive in the long-
term, institutional members must practice taking responsibility and offering apologies 
consistently with the training and support of their supervisors and peers.  It is only with such 
institutional support and consistency that the members may be convinced of the ethical, personal, 
and professional benefits of apology. 
  114
4.0  CONCLUSION 
This thesis has analyzed the ethics of apology in response to medical error by examining each 
element in part, starting with analyses of errors, wrongs, and responsibility. In the first chapter, I 
provided a typology of medical error, discussed the ethical implications of various medical 
misadventures, and explicated the relationship between harms and wrongs. Justification and 
excuse were discussed as responses to allegations of wrongdoing that are legitimately offered in 
particular circumstances. I also introduced the case example of Jesica Santillan’s heart-lung 
transplantation error that took place at Duke Hospital and the affiliated organ sharing network in 
February 2003. 
The second chapter conceptualized apology and introduced several goals of genuine 
apology sought by those who offer them. Responses to apology, such as acceptance of the 
apology and forgiveness, were discussed as taking place along a continuum rather than as all-or-
nothing phenomena. Additionally, the differences between interpersonal and institutional 
apologies were examined, culminating in my claim that institutional “apologies” are a misnomer 
for a particular kind of institutional rhetoric that lacks the ethical value of apology offered by an 
individual with standing and who feels personal remorse for individual wrongdoing. I used this 
conceptual framework to analyze the statements offered by the transplant surgeon, the hospital’s 
chief executive officer, and Duke Hospital in the wake of Jesica Santillan’s transplantation error. 
 Finally, the third chapter tied the above analyses together by describing and advocating a 
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“culture of responsibility” in heath care institutions. I argue that the culture of responsibility is 
essential to safe patient care and ethical interactions within institutions—such a culture and the 
practice of genuine apology are mutually reinforcing. The characteristics and benefits of a 
culture of responsibility were described, as well as the responsibilities incumbent upon both 
clinicians and administrators within health care institutions. To illustrate how a health care 
institution subscribing to a culture of responsibility might respond to medical error, I provided a 
hypothetical case example based on the Duke transplantation case described in the first chapter. 
I have argued that apology is an ethical and moral act, not simply an expedient or 
practical act. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider how ethical rationales support some goals of 
apology and a culture of responsibility. Most simply, apology is a demonstration of respect for 
the persons harmed by one’s mistakes or negligence. An apology acknowledges that the victim 
did not receive the care and treatment due her as a moral person and expresses the offender’s 
remorse for having committed a wrong toward another person. The offender also demonstrates 
her empathy for the victim by acknowledging the injustice of the harm her victim has suffered. 
Taking the victim’s perspective, the “view from below,” is advocated by Dietrich Bonhoeffer as 
the proper moral standpoint with regard to those who suffer.203 Berlinger describes the “view 
from below” as “the condition of suffering, whether temporary or permanent” that also “denotes 
the ethical obligation incumbent on those who are not suffering.”204 This ethical obligation is to 
work to alleviate the suffering of others, particularly when one has caused that suffering through 
her own action or inaction. In a medical context, this means that clinicians and administrators 
responsible for harming a patient have an ethical obligation to work in the patient’s interests 
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rather than their own, considering the needs of the victim in her subordinated position “below” 
their own positions of power.205
As discussed in earlier sections, the ethical and professional duty to disclose to patients 
information about their health and affecting their health care decisions can be met without 
necessarily offering an apology for error, though a genuine apology is impossible without 
disclosure. Trustworthy caregivers must be forthright and honest with their patients. However, 
honest disclosure may, in fact, undermine patients’ trust in their caregivers and the institutions 
with which they are affiliated. When a patient learns that no positive verification took place 
before her doctor performed an incorrect procedure on her or that no one caught the overdose of 
medication she was given, she may feel strongly—and rightfully, perhaps—that her doctor or 
health care facility are dangerous and unworthy of trust. The consequences of disclosure are 
more complicated when it concerns errors that do not lead to harm: Should one disclose the “near 
misses” and risk undermining patient trust? While there is no clear ethical imperative to 
apologize for harmless minor wrongs or “near misses,” clinicians and administrators should 
recognize their fear of diminished patient and public trust as legitimate and work to increase their 
own trustworthiness through improved patient care. Indeed, this recognition of one’s possible 
untrustworthiness can be traumatic for an offender and may serve as the impetus to right her 
wrongs.206 If a clinician feels strongly that she needs to “come clean” to her patient about an 
error that did not cause any expected harm to the patient, her supervisors and administrators 
would be ethically remiss to discourage such transparency for fear of reprisal or diminished trust. 
Health care institutions earn and maintain public and patient trust not by concealing their faults 
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but by adhering to ethical policies and safe protocols and by striving to improve patient care 
before errors occur or complaints are filed. 
The concept of forgiveness also confers ethical obligations upon offender and victim. 
Following Berlinger’s logic, we ought to take seriously the notions of apology and forgiveness 
following mistakes that are inevitably committed by fallible people. She reasons that, since we 
understand rationally that mistakes will occur, we need to think about the consequences and 
responses to those mistakes. Furthermore, if we recognize that truth-telling and fairness are 
valued more than concealment and neglect according to our social and professional standards, we 
should follow those standards and norms in our responses to error. Finally, if we believe that 
forgiveness is a valuable response to error because it can help victims and offenders detach from 
some of their trauma, we should not compromise the value of forgiveness by settling for “cheap 
grace” if genuine forgiveness cannot yet be offered.207 Put simply, one’s harmful error or 
negligence serves as the occasion for a genuine apology to be offered to the victim, but one’s 
apology is an insufficient condition for forgiveness to be offered in return. Forgiveness, as an 
ethically and morally rich act, ought not be impulsive, insincere, or empty. Rather, it may take 
considerable time for a victim to feel ready to offer forgiveness, if she is ever able to at all. The 
expectation of forgiveness should never serve as the sole motivation for apology, and a victim 
must not be pressured by her offender or anyone else to offer forgiveness before she is ready to 
do so.208
In summary, the ethical principles of demonstrating respect for persons and treating 
others as moral equals require that an offender offer a genuine apology to her victim(s) for her 
wrongdoing, but it does not require that a victim immediately respond with forgiveness of her 
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offender. Disclosure, an ethical and professional duty, is a precondition of apology but can open 
up individuals or institutions to criticism and diminished trust by those who have suffered at their 
hands. Apologizers risk losing the regard of their victim and other witnesses as a consequence of 
humbling themselves before their victims during an apology, but forthrightness and acting in the 
interests of the victim (adopting the “view from below”) takes moral precedence over protecting 
one’s self-concept through manipulation or deception. In several ways, then, do ethical principles 
support a culture of responsibility that includes apology, a culture essential to the safe and ethical 
provision of patient care. 
I have argued that the concept of an institutional apology, offered by a representative of 
an institution or offered on behalf of an entire institution, is ethically vacuous because it 
necessarily omits the key elements of personal remorse and empathy for the suffering of the 
victim(s). Such “apologies” often neglect the act of taking personal and specific responsibility 
for wrongdoing, thereby diminishing the statement to simple disclosure of wrongdoing or 
declaration of the values to which the institution purports to be committed. Instead, institutions 
should encourage individual members to take personal responsibility for their wrongdoing and 
support members as they offer personal apologies for wrongdoing. Administrators, as well as 
clinicians, may be culpable of wrongdoing and should be included among those who share 
responsibility in the commission of errors or the ineffectiveness of current policy. 
Fostering and maintaining a culture of responsibility that includes apology may be more 
feasible now than in the past due to shifts in law and policy designed to protect certain apologetic 
expressions as inadmissible evidence in malpractice litigation.209 Additionally, several health 
care institutions have demonstrated increasing support for truth-telling and apology through 
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attitude shifts and internal policies that aim to provide apologies and fair compensation to 
victims of medical error.210 Whether the impetus for these programs of apology and 
compensation was to reduce legal costs or to act ethically and justly to victims of medical error, 
the policies have brought about improvements in both categories. Additionally, such programs 
have the potential to increase awareness about institutional policies or practices that may 
contribute to medical error and support the change of such policies and practices. Whether such 
apology and compensation programs will proliferate or even become the new norm in medical 
institutions is uncertain, but it is clear that an ethical approach to medical care necessitates 
honest, forthright communication between caregiver and patient, including the offer of genuine 
apology in response to medical error. 
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